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FORMAL AND INFORMAL LONG-TERM HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS
by
ANDINET D. WOLDEMICHAEL
ABSTRACT
AUGUST 2013
Committee Chair: Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of two essays examining formal and informal long-term health
insurance markets. The first essay analyzes the heterogeneity of Long-Term Care Insurance
policyholders in their lapse decision, and how their ex-ante and ex-post subjective beliefs
about the probability of needing Long-Term Care affect their lapse decisions. In this essay,
I develop a model of lapse decision in a two-period insurance framework with a Bayesian
learning process and implement several empirical specifications of this model using longi-
tudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study. The results show that policyholders’
ex- ante point predictions of their probabilities and their uncertainties about them have a
persistent but declining impact on lapse decisions. Those who believe that their risk is higher
are indeed more likely to remain insured. However, as their uncertainties surrounding their
ex-ante point predictions increase, their chances of lapsing increase regardless of their initial
perception biases. These results are heterogeneous across cohorts and policyholders and, in
particular, show that those in the older group near the average age of Nursing Home entry
have a precise prediction of their risk levels compared to the younger cohort. Policy sim-
ulations show that a more informed initial purchase decision reduces the chance of lapsing
down the road.
The second essay examines the extent to which informal risk sharing arrangement pro-
vides insurance against health shocks. I develop a comprehensive model of informal risk
sharing contract with two-sided limited commitment which extends the standard model to
a regime with the following features. Information regarding the nature of realized health
shocks is imperfect and individuals’ health capital stock serves as a storage technology and
is a factor of production. The theoretical results show that, in such a regime, Pareto optimal
allocations are history dependent even if participation constraints do not bind. I perform nu-
merical analysis to show that risk sharing against health shock is less likely to be sustainable
among non-altruistic individuals with different levels of biological survival rates and health
capital productivities. The results also show that optimal allocations vary depending on the
set of information available to individuals. Using panel data of households from villages in
rural Ethiopia, I test the main predictions of the theoretical model. While there is negative
history dependence in transfers among non-altruistic partners, history dependence is positive
when risk sharing is along bloodline and kinship. However, neither short-term nor long-term
health shocks are insured through informal risk sharing arrangements among non-altruistic
individuals.
1Introduction and Summary
Risk is a part of life. People face variety of challenges related to risk of illnesses, disabilities
and frailties at some point in their lifetime. Often these shocks result in devastating financial
consequences. For instance, Long-Term Care (LTC) expenses for services such as Nursing
Home (NH) care for the disabled and for the aged are the largest uninsured financial risk
middle income elderly people face in the U.S. Similarly, individuals in developing nations
face recurrent illnesses and long-term disabilities with no access to private insurance market
or public insurance options. While elderly people in the U.S. purchase private Long-Term
Care Insurance (LTCI) policies to cushion their wealth and income from the risk of high LTC
expenses, the literature suggests that individuals in village communities resort to informal
risk sharing to help each other.
In this dissertation, I focus on understanding individuals’ decisions under risk and un-
certainty. In the first essay, I study how LTCI policy buyers’ subjective belief about the
risk of needing LTC services in the future affects their decision to lapse (drop) their policies
before the benefits kick in. In the second essay, I investigate the extent to which informal
risk sharing arrangements provide insurance against health shocks in developing countries.
The private LTCI market is still small and new to many people in the U.S. The pro-
portion of elderly individuals who purchase private LTCI policies has increased from that of
below 10% in the 1990s to above 14% in 2010. However, nontrivial proportion of policyhold-
ers lapse their policies immediately after purchase. This has been puzzling in the literature
since typical LTCI policy has to be maintained for long period of time before benefits kick
in. For the policyholders lapsing implies resumed exposure to the risk of high LTC expenses
and loss of paid premiums. At the market level it results in inefficiency if lapsers are dispro-
portionately healthy. The reasons why policyholders lapse their policies immediately after
purchase are not well understood in the literature.
The first essay contributes to the literature by investigating whether subjective beliefs
and uncertainty about future risk affects the likelihood of lapsing. In particular, I investigate:
2i) how individuals’ ex-ante subjective probabilities affect their subsequent decisions to lapse,
ii) to what extent policyholders are uncertain about their predictions of probabilities when
they originally purchase the policies and how it affects lapse, iii) how their ex-post subjective
probability affects lapse, and iv) how heterogeneous are policyholders in their lapse decisions.
I model individuals’ lapse decisions in a two-period insurance model with a Bayesian learning
process. The main assumption of the model is that a typical elderly individual updates her
belief in a Bayesian fashion. The model shows that buyers who believe that their risk of
entering a NH facility is low when they originally purchase the policy are more likely to lapse.
In addition, when their uncertainties surrounding their predictions increase their likelihood
of lapse also increases.
Using longitudinal dataset from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) between 1993
and 2010, I estimate different empirical specifications of the model. The result confirms that
individuals who believe that their risk of entering a NH facility is low when they initially pur-
chase the policy are indeed more likely to lapse afterwards than those who believe otherwise.
However, this result is heterogeneous. While ex-ante subjective probabilities significantly
affect lapsing decisions of policyholders in the younger cohort it is not the case for the older
group. Furthermore, I conduct policy simulation to show that as individuals’ uncertainty
surrounding their risk estimates at the time of purchase increases the probability of lapsing
significantly increases. This result holds regardless of their level of initial perception bias.
The implication is that informed initial purchase decision decreases the risk of early lapsing.
With regards to informal risk sharing, the consensus in the literature is that, even
if health insurance markets are missing, Pareto optimum could be achieved if risk-averse
individuals resort to informal risk sharing arrangements to help each other. Besides, the
literature establish that limited commitment and availability of storage technologies in the
form of grain, cash, livestock, and so forth increases the chance of deviation from informal
risk sharing arrangement. What is less understood is that how individuals’ health capital and
its productivity affect the performance of informal risk sharing arrangements against health
3shocks. Furthermore, it is not clear why existing empirical evidence show the existence of
informal risk sharing against income shocks but not against health shocks.
In the second essay, I study the extent to which informal risk sharing arrangements
provide insurance against health shocks in a comprehensive manner. I extend the standard
two-sided limited commitment model with storage technology to a regime where health
capital serves as a storage technology and is a factor of production as well as individuals face
imperfect information about the nature of realized health shocks. The model predicts that
the constrained Pareto optimal allocations are history dependent through three channels:
past participation constraints, health capital productivities, and biological survival rates.
It implies that informal risk sharing against health shocks is unsustainable among non-
altruistic individuals with different levels of health capital productivities and different levels
of biological survival rates. These results provide a plausible explanation for why the existing
empirical evidence does not support existence of informal risk sharing against health shocks
among non-altruistic agents. Furthermore, the model shows that optimal allocations vary
depending on the set of information available to individuals. I perform numerical analysis
to characterize the theoretical results.
In the empirical section of the second essay, I focus on testing key implications of the
theoretical model using panel data from rural Ethiopia. The result supports that there is
negative history dependence in transfers among non-altruistic households in that a household
with past obligations receives lower amount of transfer in the current period. Hence, there
is limited commitment problem. On the contrary, there is positive history dependence in
transfers among households related along bloodline and kinship. Also, although aid from
benevolent formal institutions such as churches, mosques, and aid organizations constitutes
the bulk of transfers made to households in rural Ethiopia, it crowds out transfers from
altruistic individuals. However, neither short-term nor long-term health shocks are insured
through informal risk sharing arrangements among non-altruistic households.
4Chapter 1
SUBJECTIVE BELIEF, UNCERTAINTY AND LAPSING IN LONG-TERM
CARE INSURANCE MARKET
1.1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) cost is the most important uninsured financial risk that middle-
income elderly people face in the United States. The risk of high potential LTC expenses
is particularly important for Medicaid-ineligible middle-income elderly families since Medi-
care does not pay for LTC. Although the market remains small, the proportion of elderly
individuals who purchase private Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) coverage against such
risk increased from that of below 10% in the late 1990s to 14% in 2010. At the same time,
about 9% of new customers voluntarily lapse (drop) their policies immediately after purchase
(see Figure 1.1). This has been puzzling in the literature since LTCI contracts are typically
maintained for a long period of time before benefits kick in.
Lapsation has important implications both for the market and the policyholders. At the
market level, if it is selective, where only the healthy individuals drop their policies, lapse
results in inefficiency by adversely affecting the risk pool and thereby increasing premiums
on the remaining pool. For lapsers, it implies a resumed exposure to the risk of higher
LTC expenditures and loss of paid premiums for policies that do not have a nonforfeiture
options. The existing studies suggest that lapse is partly explained by dynamic selection in
which individuals drop their policies as a result of improved health status (Finkelstein et al.,
2005), shocks to income and wealth (Finkelstein et al., 2005; Konetzka and Luo, 2011), and
uncertainty about plan features (Li and Jensen, 2012). However, the consensus is that these
factors do not fully explain the high lapse rate observed immediately after purchase.
This paper provides empirical evidence to the following research questions. How do
individuals’ ex-ante subjective probabilities affect their subsequent decisions to lapse? To
what extent are policyholders uncertain about their prediction of probabilities when they
originally purchase the policies and how does it affects lapse? How do their ex-post subjective
5probability affects lapse and how heterogeneous are policyholders in their lapse decisions?
Using a two-period insurance model with Bayesian learning, I show that policyholders who
ex-ante believe that they have a higher chance of needing LTC are less likely to subsequently
lapse. However, as their uncertainties surrounding their ex-ante point predictions increase
they are more likely to lapse even if they believe their risk is high. Using data from the
HRS and AHEAD cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the empirical results
confirm that policyholders’ subjective probabilities and their uncertainties surrounding them
have a persistent but declining impact on the subsequent decisions to lapse their LTCI
policies. These results, however, are heterogeneous both across policyholders and cohorts.
The policy simulation exercise also highlights that a well informed initial purchase de-
cision reduces the risk of lapsing down the road. This is particularly important for the
LTCI market. It is dominated by individual as oppose to group contracts and the plan have
relative complexity features. In addition, there is widespread financial illiteracy among the
near elderly and elderly individuals who are the primary customers of the product (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2007a,b). This paper complements the existing studies such as Finkelstein
et al. (2005); Konetzka and Luo (2011), and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) by providing
empirical evidence on how subjective belief about the risk of needing LTC affects the deci-
sion to lapse. It also provides empirical evidence for the conjecture that early lapsing could
be a result of the realization of “mistake” made in the original purchase. In addition, the
empirical model is explicitly built on the dynamics of belief process and provides a richer
characterization of choice under uncertainty in the LTCI market.
Purchasing private LTCI is a long-term endeavor in which on average individuals pur-
chase the policy at age 67 and entering a Nursing Home (NH) facility at 84. Potential LTCI
buyers consider several factors including the probability of needing LTC 10 to 15 years in
the future, availability of family resources in the future, the prospect of becoming eligible
for Medicaid, and so forth (Brown et al., 2012). It is difficult to know enough about their
state of health or prognosis and other possible events far in the future. They make their best
estimate conditional on their prior beliefs and the information available to them at the time.
6Figure 1.1. Industry wide Long-Term Care Insurance Policies Lapse Rate
Figure 2: Industry wide Long-Term Care Insurance Policies Lapse Rate
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Source: Society of Actuaries Long Term Care Experience Committee Intercompany Study 19842007. The
reported lapse rate is based on 4,967,276 policies sold between 1984 and 2007 using information reported
from 20 major Long-Term Care Insurance policy selling companies. About 379,882 policies are lapsed during
this period. The data excludes those companies who do not distinguish between deaths and terminations.
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7Figure 1.2. The subjective and objective probabilities of moving to a NH facilityFigure 1: The subjective and objective probabilities of moving to a NH facility
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Note: Subjective probabilities of NH entry are respondent’ stated probabilities of moving to a NH facility in
the next ﬁve years. The predicted objective probability of NH entry is estimated using two waves lead values
of actual NH entry as a dependent variable controlling for demographic characteristics and health conditions
for all respondents in all cohorts pooled between 1992 and 2010. Proportion is the row proportion of entering
NH facility. Annual Lapse rate is the biennial lapse rate divided by two. Details of how the biennial lapse
rate calculation is presented in the data section.
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It is difficult to predict the probability of needing LTC in the future with certainty. Similar
to an econometrician trying to make inference about an unknown parameter, individuals
have some degree of uncertainty (confidence interval) surrounding their point prediction of
risk. Furthermore, their assessment depends on a complex set of factors including their state
of mind at the moment, prior experience, the quality of information they possess, etc, which
could also change over time prompting them to update their assessment when necessary.
Empirical observations from the longitudinal survey of elderly individuals in the HRS moti-
vates such a claim. It shows that stated subjective probabilities of entering a NH facility in
the next five years coalesce toward the predicted objective probabilities only as individuals
near the average age of NH entry (see Figure 1.2).
However, little is known in the literature about how potential LTCI buyers form their
beliefs or expectations, evaluate their risks, and how certain they are about their predictions.
Furthermore, it is not clear how their initial beliefs about the probability of needing a care
8and their uncertainty effect the subsequent decisions to maintain or lapse their policies.
Finkelstein et al. (2005) propose that early lapsing could be a result of “the realization that
the original purchase was a mistake” suggesting the difficulty potential LTCI buyers face
in terms of assessing future prospects including their chance of needing LTC. However, the
relationship between subjective beliefs, the learning process through which they realize their
“mistakes”, and their decisions to lapse has not been well established. Since ex-ante belief
about the risk of needing a care is central to the purchase decision (Brown et al., 2012), we
need to understand how its dynamics affect their decisions to lapse.
To guide the analysis, I model individuals’ lapse decisions in a two-period insurance
model with a Bayesian learning process. The main assumption of the model is that a
typical elderly individual updates her belief in a Bayesian fashion. Specifically, she makes
her purchase decision based on her prior belief and updates her belief using the Bayes’ rule,
combining the prior with the new information she receives such as news from a medical visit,
word-of-mouth and so forth. Each period, conditional on the updated belief, she decides
whether to maintain or lapse the coverage. The model shows that high ex-ante subjective
probability has a negative and persistent, but a declining, impact on the risk of lapsing. In
addition, it shows that depending on the direction of bias relative to the objective probability
buyers’ uncertainty about their initial estimate affect their likelihood of lapse. Despite its
simplicity, the Bayes’ rule is a powerful concept applied in many real-world belief updating
processes. In addition, it has received support from experimental studies (El-Gamal and
Grether, 1995), has the advantage of empirical tractability, and has been widely applied in
marketing literature (Erdem and Keane, 1996; Ackerberg, 2003; Crawford and Shum, 2005;
Narayanan and Manchanda, 2009; Shin et al., 2012). Furthermore, it provides the mechanism
for a richer characterization of choice behavior under uncertainty.
I use a longitudinal survey data from the HRS focusing on the Asset and Health Dynam-
ics among the Oldest Old (the AHEAD) and the Original HRS cohorts biennially interviewed
from 1993 to 2010. First, I estimate a reduced-form model of lapse using the stated subjective
probabilities available in the survey to estimate the effect of ex-ante subjective probabilities
9on lapse decision. Second, I implement a learning model to pin down individuals’ ex-ante
degree of uncertainty. Then, conditional on the posterior estimates, I simulate the impact of
ex-ante uncertainty on lapse. Following Shin et al. (2012), I augment the standard learning
model with the stated initial subjective probabilities available in the survey. Augmenting
the standard learning model with survey information introduces some sort of variation in
the prior belief distribution, which helps to identify the uncertainty parameter. I implement
a random coefficient (RC) probit model to estimate the intercept and slope coefficients on
a selected time-varying covariates for each individual and allow them to be fully correlated.
Since estimating the model involves high dimensional integrals and a nonlinear functional
form, I use a Hierarchical Bayesian estimation method with Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) techniques, specifically Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs sampler.
Of course, not all individuals update their beliefs in the same fashion. Some update their
beliefs in a Bayesian way and others in a non-Bayesian way putting more weight in their prior
(underreact to new information) or put more weight on new information (overreact to new
information) (Epstein et al., 2010). This creates heterogeneity in the belief updating process
as well as lapse decision. Hence, without imposing the assumption of Bayesian learning, I
estimate a reduced-form specification of lapse using ex-post stated subjective probabilities.
The results show that both policyholders’ subjective probabilities and their degree of
uncertainty at the time of purchase significantly affect their subsequent decisions to lapse.
Those who believe that their risk of entering a NH facility is low when they originally
purchase the policy are more likely to lapse afterwards than those who believe otherwise.
However, this result is heterogeneous. While the ex-ante subjective probabilities significantly
affect lapsing decisions of policyholders in the younger cohort (the Original HRS cohort) it
is not the case for the older group (the AHEAD cohort). This suggests a dwindling impact
of ex-ante subjective belief on lapse as policyholders become older and older.
The findings from the learning model further show that the ex-ante uncertainty is signif-
icantly different from zero confirming that individuals have a confidence interval surrounding
their prediction of the probability of needing LTC. Consistent with the observed pattern in
10
Figure 1.2, uncertainty decreases over time as individuals obtain more information. Younger
elderly respondents have higher degree of uncertainty surrounding their ex-ante prediction
of the probabilities compared to those in the older cohort, which suggests that the oldest old
have a better judgment of their risk of needing LTC and seem to be more confident about it
when they first purchase their policies. The policy simulation exercise show that regardless
of the level of their ex-ante point subjective probabilities as their uncertainty surrounding
them increases the likelihood of lapsing down the road increases. This result holds regard-
less of their level of initial perception bias. Furthermore, the findings confirm that ex-post
subjective probabilities also significantly effect the likelihood of lapse. The result is robust
to various specifications and empirical models and policyholders in both cohorts. However,
the impact is significantly heterogeneous across policyholders and cohorts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
framework, which outlines the mechanism through which subjective beliefs about the prob-
ability of needing LTC affect the decisions to lapse. Section 3 presents the data used in the
analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical model and estimation method. Section 5 discusses
the results and the final section concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Based on a standard insurance model, I develop a conceptual framework of lapse decision
for a typical LTCI policyholder i with Bayesian Learning. Figure F.2 in Appendix C shows
the timing of events. There are two states of the world: good health a (able) and bad health d
(disabled). After the initial purchase, the policyholder lives for two periods, t = 1 and t = 2.
With the objective probability pii ∈ [0, 1] the policyholder becomes disabled and with the
probability 1− pii she remains able. At the time of underwriting, t = 0, the insurer provides
LTCI coverage at an actuarially fair premium, pi = αmpi
Ins
i , determined on the basis of its
initial assessment of individual i’s risk type, piInsi , average projected cost of LTC, m and α is
the coinsurance rate. Assume full coverage, α = 1, and m is a common knowledge. Once the
long-term contract is established, the insurer refrains from reclassifying the customer on the
11
basis of changes in her health status and honors legitimate claims. However, the policyholder
is free to drop coverage in any period.
Consider the case in which policyholder i has already purchased LTCI policy conditional
on her initial belief about disability risk, denoted by Πi0. She has already paid premium pi
at the time of the contract, which guarantees her coverage through period t = 1. Given that
she remains healthy and new information is revealed to her in period t = 1, she updates
her posterior belief, denoted by Πit, using Bayes’ rule. Then, conditional on the updated
belief she re-optimizes and decides whether to maintain coverage or lapse. If she decides to
maintain the policy, she pays premium pi in period t = 1 and stay insured throughout the
next period. If she decides to lapse, she pays no premium in period t = 1 but pays for LTC
out-of-pocket in the case of disability. Although, the model simplifies many of the complex
features of private LTCI market, it presents the basic sequential decision making problem of
a typical policyholder.
1.2.1 Optimal Lapse Decision
Consider a typical case in which policyholder i does not earn a periodic income. Instead
she allocates her wealth, wi, among consumption in period 1, ci1, premium payment, pi ,
if decides to stay insured, and saves the remaining amount, si, for the next period. While
lapsing saves her the amount of money that would have been spent on premium payment
in the first period, she is exposed to the risk of paying for m out-of-pocket in the second
period. Conditional on her updated belief, in period t = 1 she chooses the alternative that
maximizes the value of expected utility
max{V ki , V li } (1.1)
where V ki and V
l
i are the values of alternative specific expected utilities on the optimal
consumption path with and without insurance, respectively. The value of expected utility
12
with insurance after substituting the relevant budget constraints can be written as
V ki = maxsit{u(wi − sit − pi) + δi[(1− pˆiit)u((1 + r)sit) + pˆiitu((1 + r)sit)]}
= maxsit{u(wi − sit − pi) + δiu((1 + r)sit).}
(1.2)
Similarly, the value of expected utility without insurance can be written as
V ki = maxsit{u(wi − sit) + δi[(1− pˆiit)u((1 + r)sit) + pˆiitu((1 + r)sit −m), ]} (1.3)
where δi is the subjective discount rate and r is the market interest rate. The expression in
equations (1.2) and (1.3) are standard insurance models with objective risk pii is now replace
by the level of subjective probability, pˆiit. In the realm of Savage (1954) Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) framework, assume that utilities are additive and state-independent so that
the subjective probabilities could be uniquely identified (or inferred from the revealed choice
pattern). Although, this is a stringent assumption, the empirical model relaxes the assump-
tion by combining the revealed choice pattern with stated subjective probabilities. Without
loss of generality, assume r is very small and δi =
1
(1+r)
≈ 1. In addition, assume m < wi
and (1 + r)si > m. Furthermore, assume CARA utility specification, u(x) = −exp(−ψx),
which satisfies all the properties of the utility function, and simplifies the algebra.
The policyholder is indifferent between the two alternatives when
Vi(pi,m; pˆiit, ψ) = V
k
i (wi, pi;ψ)− V li (wi,m; pˆiit, ψ) = 0, (1.4)
where Vi(·) is a function that maps the set of points in the space (pi,m, pˆiit, ψ), which makes
the policyholder indifferent between the two alternatives. V ki (·) and V li (·) are the alternative
specific maximum values after substituting optimal s∗i obtained from a set of FOCs
1 . Wealth
variable drops out of the function Vi(·) due to the exponential utility functional form. Then,
1Details of the algebra are provided in Appendix D.
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equation (1.4) can further be simplified to take the form
V˜i(pi,m;ψ) = pˆiit, (1.5)
where V˜i(·) is now one of the solutions to Vi(·) since it is quadratic in pˆiit. Since subjective
probability is assumed to satisfy all probability rules, pˆiit ∈ [0, 1], then V˜i(·) ∈ [0, 1] is satisfied.
Figure F.2 in Appendix C graphically illustrates the optimal lapse decision of policyholder
i for arbitrary values of m, pi and ψ. For a given value of ψ an increase in pi shifts the
set (m, pˆiit) outward making lapse optimal, and an increase in m makes the decision to stay
insured optimal. Similarly, an increase in the risk aversion parameter shifts the set (m, pˆiit)
inwards making the decision to stay insured optimal.
1.2.2 The Learning Process
In this section, I model the process through which policyholders update their beliefs
about the risk of needing LTC. The main assumption is that individuals update their beliefs
in a Bayesian fashion. Through learning they achieve two goals: a reduction of bias in the
level of subjective probabilities and a reduction in the degree of uncertainty. The first is
a stochastic convergence of subjective probabilities toward the objective probabilities and
the second is a deterministic convergence of their degree of uncertainties toward zero as
they learn from new information (Shin et al., 2012). By explicitly modeling the evolution of
risk beliefs in this way, I estimate individuals’ degree of uncertainty about their predictions
at the time of purchase. The learning model has been widely applied in the Marketing
literature and elsewhere. In addition, it has been supported by evidence from experimental
studies (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995), which finds that the majority of laboratory subjects
update their beliefs regarding probabilities using Bayes’ rule. Hence, the learning model is
a plausible approach to explain the updating behavior of LTCI policyholders.
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Then, assuming policyholder i’s initial level of subjective probability is normally dis-
tributed
Πi0 ∼ n(pˆii0, σ2pˆii0), (1.6)
where pˆii0 = pii + νi0 is the level of initial subjective probability, νi0 is the level of bias in
initial subjective probability (i.e, the level of overestimation or underestimation of the true
probability), and σ2pˆii0 is the initial degree of uncertainty policyholder i has surrounding her
point prediction of the probability of needing LTC. The initial subjective probability could
be greater than, less than or equal to the objective probability depending on the level of
bias. Also, let Πsit denotes the signal she receives in period t, which provides unbiased but
noisy information about the objective risk of disability. The signal is assumed to be normally
distributed around the objective probability with variance σ2si ,
Πsit = pii + ξit, (1.7)
where ξit ∼ n(0, σ2si) is the signal noise, which has zero mean and constant variance. Since
the policyholder is assumed to update her belief using Bayes’ rule, by recursive substitution,
her posterior belief can be written as
Πit | Πit−1 ∼ n(pˆiit, σ2pˆiit), (1.8)
where
pˆiit =
σ2pˆiit
σ2pˆiit−1
pˆiit−1 +
σ2pˆiit
σ2si
Πsit (1.9)
is the posterior subjective probability and
σ2pˆiit =
(
1
σ2pˆiit−1
+
yit
σ2si
)−1
(1.10)
is the posterior degree of uncertainty, and yit is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
policyholder keeps her policy and 0 otherwise. The posterior level of subjective probability
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is given by the weighted average of the prior level of subjective probability and the signal
received in period t. In equation (1.9), if she has high degree of prior uncertainty (i.e., high
σ2pˆiit−1), then she puts less weight on her prior belief and more weight on the signal. Similarly,
if the signal is noisy with high degree of variance, σ2si , then she puts less weight on the new
information. Finally, in equation (1.10) the posterior degree of uncertainty emanates from
the prior degree of uncertainty and the variance of the signal. High prior degree of uncertainty
implies high posterior degree of uncertainty, and vice-versa.
The difficulty with equations (1.9) and (1.10) is that we do not have information on
the type of signal (or signals) the policyholder receives and how noisy it is. Hence, I assume
that a composite signal is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and
unit variance, σ2si = 1. Furthermore, by successive substitution equation (1.9) and (1.10) are
simplified to take the following expression2
pˆiit = pii +
1
σ2pˆii0
νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξiτ
1
σ2pˆii0
+ ni(t)
(1.11)
and
σ2pˆiit =
(
1
σ2pˆii0
+ ni(t)
)−1
(1.12)
where ni(t) = Σ
t
τ=1yiτ is the number of periods policyholder i stay insured up until period
t. Equations (1.11)-(1.12) have intuitive and empirical appeals. Intuitively the level of
subjective probabilities starts from pˆii0 and converges to the objective risk type, pii, as the
individual learns from new information (i.e, pˆiit → pii as t → ∞). If the bias in the level
of initial risk belief is zero, νi0 = 0, and the policyholder is certain about her assessment of
future risk, then σ2pˆii0 = 0 and there is nothing to learn about the objective probability of
needing care. In such cases equation (1.11) collapses to the traditional model specification in
which pˆiit = pii and σ
2
pˆiit
= 0. Due to the conjugacy of the prior, the signal and the posterior
distributions, the model is empirically tractable.
2Details are provided in Appendix B.
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1.2.3 Implications
Combining the results from the optimal lapse decision and the learning model, the
policyholder is indifferent when
V˜i(pi,m;ψ)− pˆiit(σ2pˆii0 , νi0, pii, ξit, ni(t)) = 0 (1.13)
Equation (1.13) summarizes the central thesis of the study. It implies that: i) High level of
bias in the ex-ante subjective probability, νi0, shrinks the optimal lapse region, and thereby
reduces the chance of lapsing and vice-versa. Those with high ex-ante subjective probabilities
tend to maintain their coverage. However, the impact of ex-ante subjective probability on
lapse decreases as the duration of ownership increase. ii) The effect of high degree of ex-ante
uncertainty, σ2pˆii0 , on lapse is non-linear and depends on the signal noise and the level of bias
in ex-ante subjective probabilities.
1.3 The Data
I use data from the HRS3 longitudinal survey of the elderly people between 1993 and
2010. It is one of the few publicly available and nationally representative longitudinal surveys
focusing on the near elderly and the elderly population. It is specifically suitable for this
study because it has information on LTCI ownership status, from which I construct the
lapse variable, and stated subjective probabilities of entering a NH facility. Of the five
cohorts entered the study in different calendar years, I focus on the two prominent cohorts,
the Original HRS and the AHEAD cohorts. Sampling is based on stratified, multistage
probability design in which blacks and Hispanics are oversampled. The interview has been
conducted every two years.
While interviewing the Original HRS cohort started in 1992 with more than 12,000
respondents born between 1931 and 1941, the AHEAD cohort entered the study in 1993
3I merge the RAND Corporation version L Fat file with the HRS core file to construct the various
variables.
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with more than 8,000 respondents born before 1924. The subjective probability questions
have been asked to individuals above the age of 60 with different wordings for age group
60-69 and those above 69. Respondents in the AHEAD cohort have been asked the same
question in every wave since 1993, whereas respondents above the age of 60 in the Original
HRS cohort have been asked the question since 1996. I use observations from the Original
HRS cohort between 1996 and 2010 and the AHEAD cohort between 1993 and 2010.
There is no direct survey question that consistently asks policyholders’ lapse status. As
a result I construct a dummy variable indicating lapse status from the responses given to
the LTCI ownership questions in two consecutive waves. Studies such as Konetzka and Luo
(2011) and Li and Jensen (2012) use a similar approach to construct lapse variable. Lapse
dummy takes the value 1 if a respondent reports to own LTCI policy in the previous wave
but not in the current wave given that she is alive and not in an institution (including a NH
facility). The LTCI ownership question is phrased as “Not including government programs,
do you now have any insurance which specifically pays any part of LTC services, such as
personal or medical care in the home or in a nursing home?”
Since the dependent variable is constructed from another self-reported variable, it could
be prone to reporting error. I use a detailed follow-up question to verify the credibility
of those responses. The follow-up question is phrased as “Does this plan cover care in a
nursing home facility only, personal or long-term care at home, or both in-home and nursing
home care?” For about 6% of the individual-year observations responses to the follow-up
question are missing or reported as “Do Not Know”. However, I replace the missing responses
to the follow-up question by the responses given in the previous waves conditional that the
respondent has LTCI for two consecutive waves. Observations that do not fulfill such criteria
are excluded. In additions, I exclude observations succeeding the first lapse episode from
the analysis. Furthermore, I ignore recurrent lapsing cases, which are about 3% of the
individual-year observations. The subjective probability question is phrased as “(What is
the % chance) that you will [ever have to move to a nursing home/move to a nursing home
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in the next five years]?” Only those above age 60 have been asked this question and about
45% of them report a 0% chance of moving to a NH facility.
I include variables to control for the effect of premiums, substitutes (such as family care
and Medicaid eligibility), LTC cost, preference and regional differences. The ideal approach
would be to use premium data on the specific LTCI plan each policyholder owns. Although,
the HRS asks about how much they pay for LTCI premiums, the information is unreliable
due to errors and miss-reporting. Instead I follow the literature (such as Finkelstein et al.
(2005); Finkelstein and McGarry (2006); Konetzka and Luo (2011) among others) to control
for the effect of premiums by including variables that insurance companies use at the time
of underwriting. These set of pre-purchase variables include age, sex and the history of
health conditions such as the number of Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Instrumental
Activities of Daily Living (IADL) limitations, and the number of doctor diagnosed health
conditions ever had4.
In order to control for the effect of substitutes such as availability of informal or fam-
ily care and eligibility to Medicare, I include demographic variables such as marital status,
household size, the number of living children and siblings as well as the levels of household
income and wealth. Demographic composition in the household not only controls for substi-
tutes but also joint decision making and preference towards private LTCI in the household.
Furthermore, I include years of education, ownership of life insurance, and ownership of
health insurance other than those provided by the government, the employer, or the private
LTCI to control for preference heterogeneity, and other factors such as risk aversion, bequest
motives and subjective discount rates. Finally, I use the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
state-level medical inflation data to control for LTC costs, state dummies, and the interac-
tion between state dummies and year dummies to control for state-level differences such as
4Activities of Daily Living (ADL) include the basic things we normally do for self-care such as eating,
bathing, dressing, toileting and transferring. Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) include the
more complex and planning aspect of things that we normally do such as shopping, taking medication,
managing money, using a telephone and preparing meals. Doctor diagnosed conditions include high blood
pressure, Diabetes, Cancer, Lung Disease, Heart Disease, Stroke, Psychiatric disorder and Arthritis.
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LTCI rate adjustments approved by the State Insurance Commissions. Description of the
variables used in the study are presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.2. provides summary statistics of the full set of variables for the AHEAD
and the Original HRS cohorts consisting of individuals who responded to the subjective
probability questions. The overall lapse rate calculated from the combined sample is 23%,
which translates into about 11% annual lapse rate. Compared to the non-lapsing group those
who let their policies to lapse believe that they have lower risk of entering a NH facility (
i.e., 18% vs. 23%). When we look at the pattern by cohort, respondents in the AHEAD
cohort have annual lapse rate of 12% whereas those in the HRS cohort have annual lapse
rate of 11%. In both cohorts those who lapse their policies believe to have a lower chance
of entering a NH facility compared to those in the non-lapsing group. These differences in
means between the two groups are statistically significant. In general, the descriptive table
shows that higher lapse rate is associated with lower subjective probability of needing LTC.
The patterns in lapse rate and subjective probabilities are distinct. Respondents in the
older cohort (the AHEAD cohort) have higher lapse rate along with higher levels of subjective
probabilities compared to those in the younger cohort (the Original HRS cohort). The same
story is observed in the Kaplan-Meier survival rates and smoothed hazard rates (Figure F.1
in Appendix C. In both cohorts, the lapsing group purchases LTCI policy at an older age
compared to the non-lapsing group. This reflects the role of initial classification into a high
risk group, and being locked into higher premium levels, which perhaps prompt subsequent
lapsing. Furthermore, respondents who let their policy to lapse have larger family size, have
more live children and siblings but less likely to be married and to be white. In addition,
individuals in the lapsing group are less educated and have lower levels of income and wealth.
In terms of health status, respondents in the lapsing group have poor health conditions with
higher number of ADL and IADL limitations and the number of doctor diagnosed health
conditions. Although, it is seems counter intuitive that poor health conditions increase the
likelihood of lapse, it could be the case that insurance companies observe those conditions
at the time of underwriting and classify them into a high-risk high-premium category. In
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addition, new health conditions that do not necessarily trigger the need for LTC could also
prompt lapsing as policyholders prioritize their resources on the treatment of current health
problems instead of paying premiums for insurance against future risk of disability.
1.4 The Empirical Model and Estimation Methods
1.4.1 The Setup
First I estimate the effect of ex-ante and ex-post subjective probabilities on the sub-
sequent decisions to lapse using a reduced-form specification, and then I implement the
learning model to estimate the ex-ante degree of uncertainty and its effect on lapse. Both
specifications are derived from the solution to the maximization problem obtained in section
1.2. From equations (1.5) and (1.13) the probability of lapsing for policyholder i in period t
can be written as
Pr(dit = 1 | ·) = Pr[V˜i(pi,mt;ψ)− pˆiit(σ2pˆii0 , νi0, pii, ξit, ni(t)) + ˜it ≤ 0],
= Pr[˜it ≤ pˆiit(σ2pˆii0 , νi0, pii, ξit, ni(t))− V˜i(pi,mt;ψ)],
(1.14)
where dit is a dummy variable indicating lapse, ˜it is a random error term capturing unob-
served factors. All other notations are as defined before. I use the following assumptions to
parameterize the model. The non-linear expression in (1.5) is approximated by
V˜i(pi,mt;ψ) = θ1 ln(pi) + θ˜2 ln(mt) + θ3Zi, (1.15)
where Zi is a vector of variables that controls for the risk aversion parameter ψ and other
time-invariant individual level factors, θ1, θ˜2 and θ3 are parameters. Assuming that premium
is determined on the basis of the initial risk classification and the average cost of care, i.e.,
pi = m0pi
Ins
i , it could be specified as
ln(pi) = ln(m0) + ln(pi
Ins
i ), (1.16)
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where m0 is the average level of LTC cost that the insurance company estimate at the time
of underwriting and piInsi is the insurance company’s prediction of individual i’s risk level.
The term ln(piInsi ) is not observed since there is no information on the specific formula or
model the insurance companies use to calculate risk and classify individuals into different
categories. Instead, as discussed in the data section, I use control variables to account for
it. Then, equation (1.15) takes the following linear form
V˜i(pi,mt;ψ) = θ1Xi0 + θ2m˜t + θ3Zi, (1.17)
where Xi0 is a vector of ex-ante control variables for risk classification (ln(pi
Ins
i )) and m˜t
is state level medical inflation rate to control for changes in LTC costs. The expression in
(1.17) is amenable to a standard estimation method.
1.4.2 The ex-ante Subjective Probabilities
I estimate the effect of ex-ante subjective probabilities on lapse using a reduced form
specification of the following form
Pr(dit = 1 | ·) = Pr[it ≤ γi + βpii0 + θ1Xi0 + θ2m˜t + θ3Zi + θi4Xit],
= Φ(βpii0 + θXit + ΓiX˜it),
(1.18)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function, β and θ = [θ1, θ2, θ3] are fixed
coefficients to be estimated, Γi = [γi θi4] is a vector of random coefficients, pii0 is stated
ex-ante subjective probability, Xit = [Xi0 m˜t Zi] is a vector comprising of controls for
initial risk classification (Xi0), state-level differences in costs of LTC (m˜t), time-invariant
demographic and other covariates such as sex, race, etc, (Zi), X˜it = [1 X˜it] is a vector of
ones and a vector of all other time-varying control variables such as the number of ADLs and
IADLs limitaitons, the number of new doctor diagnosed conditions, SRHS, log of wealth,
household size, etc, and it is the error term capturing all unobserved factors and it is assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance.
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1.4.3 The ex-ante Uncertainty: Identification
The next step is to identify the ex-ante degree of uncertainty using the learning model.
The empirical specification of this model stems from the expressions obtained in the optimiza-
tion problem, equation (1.5), and the parameterized expressions in equations (1.13)-(1.17).
Then, the probability of lapse for policyholder i in period t is given by
Pr(dit = 1 | ·) = Pr
[
it ≤ pii +
1
σ2pˆii0
νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξiτ
1
σ2pˆii0
+ ni(t)
+ θXit + ΓiX˜it
]
. (1.19)
The main learning parameters in the model are the objective risk, pii, the initial degree of
uncertainty, σ2pˆii0 , the level of bias in the initial risk belief, νi0, and the signal noise, ξit.
However, with the data at hand it is difficult to identify all these parameters. For instance,
we cannot identify pii, σ
2
pˆii0
and {ξiτ}tτ=1 at the same time. Instead I estimate the common
coefficient, σ2pˆi0 , as opposed to estimating σ
2
pˆii0
for all individuals and use the raw differences
between the stated subjective probabilities of moving to a NH facility reported in the wave
prior to LTCI purchase and the predicted objective probability of actual NH entry in the
next five years (two waves) 5 as a proxy for ex-ante perception bias, νi0. Furthermore, I let
the objective level of risk to be a function of a vector of observed health conditions, Hit, such
as ADLs, IADLs and the number of new doctor diagnosed conditions
pii = Γ˜iHit, (1.20)
where Γ˜i is a vector of individual level coefficients on the observed health conditions. Finally,
I simulate the values for the signal noise {ξiτ}tτ=1 for each individual from its conditional
distribution. Now, only Γ˜i , σ
2
pˆi0
, and {ξiτ}tτ=1 are estimated from the data. These assump-
tions and restrictions make the Bayesian learning process fully identified.
5I adjust the predicted objective probability of NH entry for marital status, age, sex, SRHS, smoking
status, number of health conditions, number of ADLs and IADLs limitations, number of live children and
siblings, log of income and wealth. I estimate the probability of staying in a NH facility in the next two
waves (i.,e, approximately 5 years), which can be written as: Pr(NHi,t+1|t+2 = 1)˙ = Pr(βXit). Then
P̂ r(NHi,t+1|t+2 = 1)˙ is obtained for each individual in each wave.
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Policy Simulation
The effect of ex-ante uncertainty on lapse probability is nonlinear. So, I perform policy
simulation to estimate the average effect of ex-ante uncertainty on lapse outcome, i.e.,
∂Eξit,Γi
[
Pr(dit = 1 | ·)
]
∂σpˆi0
, (1.21)
where Eξit,Γi denotes integration over the signal noise, ξit, and a vector of all other random
coefficients, Γi.
1.4.4 The ex-post Subjective Probabilities
Similar to the specification in equation (1.18) the probability of lapsing can be written
as
Pr(dit = 1 | ·) = Φ(βipiit + θXit + ΓiX˜it), (1.22)
where piit is stated ex-post subjective probability available in the survey and βi is individual-
level coefficient to be estimated. All other notations are as defined earlier.
1.4.5 Estimation Methods
I start by estimating the specification in equation (1.18) using Linear Probability Mod-
els (LPMs) using simple Pooled OLS. However, estimation using survey reported subjec-
tive probabilities could be muddied by endogeneity, which arises from at least two possible
sources, omitted variables, and unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated coefficient of OLS
could be picking up the effect of omitted variable such as discounting behavior, bequest
motives, belief updating behavior, etc, which influences both subjective beliefs and the de-
cisions to lapse. Since ex-ante subjective probability is time-invariant, and the Fixed Effects
(FE) model is not applicable, I estimate a linear random effects (RE) model to account
for unobserved heterogeneity. However, since the RE model imposes a restrictive assump-
tion of independence between the covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity, I estimate a
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Mundlak (1978a) and Chamberlain (1984) correlated random effects (CRE) probit specifica-
tion. This specification allows for modest correlation between mean of selected time-varying
covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition, I estimate the fully specified model in equation (1.18) using a random coef-
ficients (RC) (also known as mixed coefficients) probit model using a Hierarchical Bayesian
method. This model allows for estimation of the slope coefficients on selected time-varying
covariates such as the ex-post health status (i.e., the number of ADLs, IADLs limitations,
SRHS, and the number of doctor diagnosed health conditions) and the intercept for each
individual. Such approach fosters greater level of heterogeneity and allows the unobserved
individual level effect to be fully correlated with individual-level slope coefficients. I use
a similar approach to estimate the coefficient on ex-post subjective probability specified in
equation (1.22) along with the fixed effects (FE) method of LPM. Finally, I estimate the
learning model specified in equation (1.19) and the policy simulation exercise using MCMC
methods, specifically Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs algorithm.
From equation (1.16) and (1.17), the model with learning structure can be written as
Pr(dit = 1|Xit, pii, θ, σ2pˆi0 , νi0, ξit) = Pr
[
it ≤ αi + γiHit +
1
σ2pˆi0
νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξiτ
1
σ2pˆi0
+ ni(t)
+ θXit
]
(1.23)
where it ∼ n(0, 1). Using latent variable form it can compactly be written as
d∗it = ΓiHit +
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
+ θXit + it (1.24)
where Γi = [αi γi], is a vector of random coefficients, and θ is a vector of fixed param-
eters. Then the kernel for the joint posterior latent variables and parameters augmented
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distribution is given by
p({d∗it}, {Γi},Γ,Σ, ln(σ−2pˆi0 ), {ξiτ}tτ=1|H,X, n, d) ∝
N∏
i=1
Ti∏
t=1
{
exp(−0.5(d∗it − ΓiHit −
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
− θXit)2)
×(I(dit = 0)I(d∗it ≤ 0) + I(dit = 1)I(d∗it ≥ 0))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5(θ − µθ0)′V −1θ0 (θ − µθ0))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5(Γi − Γ)′Σ−1(Γi − Γ))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5(Γ− µΓ0)′V −1Γ0 (Γ− µΓ0)
}
×
{
|Σ|( g0−k−12 )
|S0|
g0
2
exp(−0.5tr(ΣS−10 ))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5 1
Vσ0
(ln(σ−2pˆi0 )− µσ0)2)
}
×
{
exp(−0.5ξ2it)
}
.
(1.25)
I specify non informative conjugate priors for the model, which are given by
p(Γ) ∼ n(µΓ0 , VΓ0) = n(0, 100I)
p(θ) ∼ n(µθ0 , Vθ0) = n(0, 100I)
p(Σ) ∼ iw(g0, S0) = iw(k + 1, I)
p({ξiτ=1}t) ∼ n(0, 1)
p(ln(σ−2pˆi0 )) ∼ n(µσ0 , Vσ0) = n(0, 100I)
(1.26)
Then, the posterior draws could be performed by cycling through the following steps until
convergence is achieved.
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The Algorithm
1. Sample d∗it
2. Sample Γi for each individual using Gibbs
3. Sample Γ using Gibbs
4. Sample θ using Gibbs
5. Sample Σ using Gibbs
6. Sample ln(σ−2pˆi0 ) using MH
7. Sample {ξiτ=1}t for each individual using MH
Appendix C presents details of the algorithm. Before the algorithm is implemented using the
real dataset, I verify its performance and accuracy in recovering the true parameters using
simulated data. The decision on the appropriate number of burn-ins is guided by Geweke’s
convergence diagnostics (Geweke, 1991). Figure F.4 in Appendix C shows the trace plot of
posterior draws for selected parameter estimates.
1.5 Results and Discussions
In this section, I discuss the effect of policyholders’ ex-ante point prediction of their
probabilities of needing LTC on the likelihood of lapsing from the reduced-form estimations.
Next, I present the results from the learning model, which estimates policyholders’ degree of
uncertainty surrounding their ex-ante point predictions. In addition, I discuss results from
the policy simulation exercise. Finally, I discuss results on the impact of ex-post subjective
probability and the heterogeneity in lapse decision.
1.5.1 Ex-ante Subjective probability
The findings show that while for the younger cohort initial subjective probability sig-
nificantly influences their later decision to lapse, it is not the case for the old group. Table
1.3. presents the results from the LPM using Pooled OLS for different specifications and
and samples. For each cohort, I estimate the specifications for all sample and a subsample
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that excludes left-censored observations. The restricted sample excludes individuals who re-
ported to already own LTCI policies in the first round. In the first raw with no controls, the
coefficient on ex-ante subjective probability for the Original HRS cohort is negative (= -0.24)
and significant at 1% implying that one standard deviation increase in ex-ante subjective
probability reduces lapse rate by about 27%. When left-censored observations are excluded
the coefficient becomes much smaller (-0.07) but still significant at 1%. It implies that one
standard deviation increase in ex-ante subjective probability reduces lapse rate by about 8%.
On the other hand, the coefficient in all specifications and all samples is insignificant for the
AHEAD cohort. Specifications (2)-(8) cumulatively add different controls into the model.
Next, I discuss the results for the Original HRS cohorts when additional controls enter
the regression. Policyholders could lapse their policies because they were locked into higher
premiums when they initially purchase the policy. Controlling for initial risk classification
by insurance companies using pre-purchase information such as age, the number of ADLs
and IADLs limitations, the number of doctor diagnosed conditions ever had, and the LTCI
coverage type (dummies for NH care only and dummy for Home Care only in which the base
is Comprehensive coverage) and log of household income in specification/row (2) reduces
the magnitude of the coefficient to -0.14 for the whole sample but increases to -0.095 for the
subsample excluding left-censored observations. Specification (3) controls for demographic
characteristics and household composition such as marital status, sex, race, household size,
the number of living children, and the number of living siblings, which control for availability
of substitutes such as informal insurance and family care and other heterogeneity that arises
from family composition. Furthermore, controlling for ex-post health conditions, such as the
number of ADLs and IADLs limitations, the number of new doctor diagnosed conditions and
SRHS. In this case the magnitude of the coefficient for the whole sample slightly declined to
-0.11 but remains to be stable for the limited subsample.
Specification (4) controls for the logarithm of household wealth, ownership of life in-
surance policy, ownership of private health insurance policy other than those provided by
the government, employer or private LTCI plans, and smoking status. Although, Medicaid
30
De
pe
nd
en
t V
ar
iab
le:
Po
lic
y V
ar
iab
le:
Co
ef
f.
St
d. 
Er
r
Co
ef
f.
St
d. 
Er
r
Co
ef
f.
St
d. 
Er
r
Co
ef
f.
St
d. 
Er
r
1
No
 co
nt
ro
ls
-0
.23
5*
**
(0
.02
6)
-0
.06
87
**
(0
.03
43
)
-0
.03
3
(0
.02
2)
-0
.02
9
(0
.03
6)
2
[+
]P
re
-p
ur
ch
as
e; 
Co
ve
ra
ge
 T
yp
e
-0
.14
4*
**
(0
.02
7)
-0
.09
48
**
*
(0
.03
58
)
-0
.02
1
(0
.02
2)
-0
.01
7
(0
.03
6)
3
[+
]D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st
-0
.11
8*
**
(0
.02
7)
-0
.09
68
**
*
(0
.03
56
)
-0
.01
2
(0
.02
1)
-0
.00
6
(0
.03
7)
4
[+
]W
ea
lth
 &
 O
th
er
 In
su
ra
nc
e O
wn
er
sh
ip
-0
.10
6*
**
(0
.02
7)
-0
.10
3*
**
(0
.03
54
)
-0
.01
2
(0
.02
1)
-0
.00
9
(0
.03
6)
5
[+
]M
ed
. I
nf
lat
io
n
-0
.11
8*
**
(0
.02
6)
-0
.09
79
**
*
(0
.03
53
)
-0
.00
9
(0
.02
1)
-0
.00
3
(0
.03
6)
6
[+
]R
eg
io
na
l D
um
m
ies
-0
.11
3*
**
(0
.02
6)
-0
.08
94
**
(0
.03
55
)
-0
.01
1
(0
.02
1)
-0
.00
5
(0
.03
6)
7
[+
]R
eg
io
n B
y Y
ea
r D
um
m
ies
-0
.11
4*
**
(0
.02
4)
-0
.08
23
**
(0
.03
43
)
-0
.01
9
(0
.02
0)
-0
.00
1
(0
.03
5)
8
[+
]In
ter
ac
tio
n P
re
-P
ur
ch
as
e H
ea
lth
-0
.10
8*
**
(0
.02
6)
-0
.11
0*
**
(0
.03
72
)
-0
.02
0
(0
.02
1)
-0
.00
7
(0
.03
7)
Ta
bl
e 3
: R
eg
re
ss
io
n R
es
ul
ts 
of
 L
in
ea
r P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y M
od
el:
 P
oo
led
 O
LS
No
. O
bs
. =
 2,
22
6
No
. O
bs
. =
 4,
06
4
No
. O
bs
. =
 1,
59
3
No
te:
 S
tan
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
in
 pa
re
nt
he
se
s *
**
 p<
0.0
1, 
**
 p<
0.0
5, 
* p
<0
.1.
 1)
 P
re
-P
ur
ch
as
e; 
Co
ve
ra
ge
 T
yp
e i
nc
lu
de
s: 
pr
e-
pu
rc
ha
se
 ag
e, 
AD
Ls
, 
IA
DL
s, 
No
. o
f d
oc
to
r d
iag
no
se
d c
on
di
tio
ns
 ev
er
 ha
d a
nd
 lo
g o
f i
nc
om
e; 
an
d C
ov
er
ag
e T
yp
e i
nc
lu
de
s, 
du
m
m
y f
or
 N
H 
on
ly
 co
ve
ra
ge
 an
d 
du
m
m
y f
or
 H
om
e C
ar
e o
nl
y c
ov
er
ag
e, 
2)
 D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st 
in
clu
de
 de
m
og
ra
ph
ic 
ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ics
 su
ch
 as
 m
ar
ita
l s
tat
us
, s
ex
, r
ac
e, 
ye
ar
s o
f 
ed
uc
ati
on
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 si
ze
, n
o. 
of
 li
ve
 ch
ild
re
n, 
no
. o
f l
iv
e s
ib
lin
gs
 an
d v
ete
ra
n s
tat
us
; a
nd
 E
x-
po
st 
he
alt
h v
ec
to
r s
uc
h A
DL
s, 
 IA
DL
s, 
no
. o
f 
co
nd
iti
on
s a
nd
 S
RH
S.
 3)
 W
ea
lth
 an
d O
th
er
 In
su
ra
nc
e O
wn
er
sh
ip
 in
clu
de
s l
og
 of
 w
ea
lth
; a
nd
 li
fe
 in
su
ra
nc
e o
wn
er
sh
ip
, a
nd
 ot
he
r p
riv
ate
 he
alt
h 
in
su
ra
nc
e o
wn
er
sh
ip
 ot
he
r t
ha
n t
ho
se
 pr
ov
id
ed
 by
 go
v't
 an
d L
TC
I c
ov
er
ag
e. 
4)
 m
ed
ica
l I
nf
lat
io
n i
nc
lu
de
 in
fla
tio
n l
ev
els
 by
 re
gi
on
. 5
) R
eg
io
na
l 
Du
m
m
ies
 in
clu
de
 du
m
m
ies
 fo
r c
en
su
s d
iv
isi
on
s. 
7)
 In
ter
ac
tio
n p
re
-p
ur
ch
as
e H
ea
lth
 in
clu
de
 du
m
m
ies
 fo
r i
nt
er
ac
tio
n t
er
m
s b
etw
ee
n e
ac
h l
ev
el 
of
 ag
e, 
AD
Ls
, I
AD
Ls
, n
o. 
of
 co
nd
iti
on
s, 
an
d s
ex
.
Co
nt
ro
ls
No
. O
bs
. =
 4,
03
8
La
ps
e D
um
m
y
Ex
-a
nt
e S
ub
jec
tiv
e P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y [
0,1
]
Th
e O
rig
in
al
 H
RS
 C
oh
or
t
Th
e A
H
EA
D 
Co
ho
rt
In
clu
di
ng
 L
ef
t-
Ce
ns
or
ed
 O
bs
.
Ex
clu
di
ng
 L
ef
t-
Ce
ns
or
ed
 O
bs
.
In
clu
di
ng
 L
ef
t-
Ce
ns
or
ed
 O
bs
.
Ex
clu
di
ng
 L
ef
t-
Ce
ns
or
ed
 O
bs
.
T
ab
le
1.
3.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
L
in
ea
r
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
M
o
d
el
:
P
o
ol
ed
O
L
S
31
is a means-tested public insurance program meant for the indigent, people could transfer
their assets to family members or to others in order to game the system. However, most
states have a three to five years look back rules on wealth to mitigate such problems. Hence,
wealth along with income is a plausible control for actual and potential substitution effect
of Medicaid that could entice private LTCI policyholders to lapse. Furthermore, including
ownership of private life insurance and other private health insurance policies controls for
preference towards insurance, which Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find it to be a signifi-
cant factor affecting purchase and lapse of LTCI policies. Controlling for these factors has a
negligible impact on the coefficient of interest, which remains to be significant and negative.
LTC cost is an important part of lapse decision. Specification (5) controls for region-
level medical inflation. As shown in the conceptual framework, Section 2 (also see Figure
F.2 in Appendix C), high LTC cost discourages lapse. The coefficient on medical inflation is
negative and statistically significant in all specifications and the coefficient on ex-ante sub-
jective probability is almost intact and remains to be significant. Although, most states put
forth premium stabilization rules which dictate stable premiums for individual policyholders
regardless of the change in their health conditions, insurance companies are still allowed to
increase premiums for a certain risk group upon a case-by-case approval from the State Insur-
ance Commission. Approved rate adjustments have especially been frequent and widespread
since the early 2000s [Figure 1.3]. As a result, policyholders are more likely to be reclassified
into a high risk high premium category, which makes it difficult to afford especially for those
on the margin. Unfortunately, the information on reclassification or premium adjustment
is not available at the individual level. However, I include state dummies (census-division
dummies in this version), year dummies and state-year interaction dummies in specifications
(6) and (7). Controlling for regional and time variations do not affect the magnitude of the
coefficient, which remains to be significant at 1%.
In the last specification, row (8), I estimate the model by controlling for ex-ante risk
classification with a richer specification. Specifically, I include dummy variables for each
pre-purchase age level, each number of ADLs and IADLs limitations, each number of doctor
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diagnosed conditions ever had, and the full interaction among these dummies and with sex.
Such specification is important in order to adequately control for initial risk classification
since no information is available regarding the actual formula or model the insurance com-
panies use to determine premiums. In this specification the coefficient is -0.108 and -0.11
and statistically significant at 1% for the whole sample and the limited sample, respectively.
This means that one standard deviation higher in subjective probability when individuals
originally purchase their policies leads to a 12% lower chance of subsequently dropping the
policies. On the contrary, the coefficient for respondents in the older cohort (the AHEAD
cohort) who are near the average age of NH entry. Hence, individuals’ ex-ante beliefs seem
to have persistent but declining impact on the subsequent decision to maintain or lapse their
policies.
Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 present the results from LPM using RE model and CRE pro-
bit model. The RE model imposes a restrictive assumption of independence between the
unobserved heterogeneity and the covariates. The CRE approach relaxes this assumption
by allowing correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and covariates. The reported
quantities are the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and their standard deviations. The
result echoes those obtained in the LPMs using Pooled OLS and RE in which ex-ante sub-
jective probability significantly effects lapse decision of the younger cohort but not the oldest
old.
Finally, Table 1.6 presents the results from a much flexible specification of a RC probit
model using Hierarchical Bayesian method. The model allows estimation of the intercept
and slopes parameters on time-varying covariates such as ex-post ADLs, IADLs, the number
of new doctor diagnosed conditions and SRHS for each individual as well as estimation of
the full correlation matrix among them. The priors of the model are all non-informative.
As shown in the table, the Marginal Effects (MEs) are very close to those obtained in the
Chamberlain RE probit model. Similar to the results in the other specifications, the ex-
ante subjective probability significantly effects lapse decisions of those in the Original HRS
cohort but not the AHEAD cohort. In general, the results suggest a persistent but dwindling
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impact of ex-ante subjective belief on the subsequent decision to lapse. Similar results are
documented in Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) in which those policyholders who believe to
have higher levels of risk are more likely to buy insurance and actually be higher risk than
insurance companies expect.
1.5.2 Ex-ante Uncertainty
Table 1.7 presents the results from the learning model specified in equation (1.16) and
(1.17), which is estimated using the RC probit model. The priors of the model are all non-
informative. The goal is to estimate the policyholders’ ex-ante degree of uncertainty, σ2pˆi0
(or σpˆi0 in standard deviation), surrounding their point estimate of the probability of need-
ing care, pˆiit. This model controls for factors related to the initial risk classification by the
insurance companies, demographic characteristics, ex-post health conditions, ownership of
other insurance policies, the levels of household income and wealth, LTCI plan type, medical
inflation, and regional variation. Furthermore, I use proxy variable for the initial perception
bias, which is constructed from the difference between the stated ex-ante subjective proba-
bilities of entering a NH facility and the predicted objective probabilities of actual NH entry
in the next five years (two waves). Since the signal variance is restricted to unit (σ2si = 1),
the interpretation of the estimated degree of uncertainty is relative to the signal variance.
As discussed in section 1.2, had policyholders been certain about their point prediction
of the probabilities, their degree of uncertainty, σ2pˆi0 , would have been zero. However, the
estimated degree of uncertainty is different from zero for both cohorts. For respondents in
the AHEAD cohort the estimate is 1.036(0.176) and for the HRS cohort it is 1.354(0.049).
This implies that policyholders have nonzero degree of uncertainty about their own risk
assessment at the time of purchase. However, the magnitude of the estimate varies by
cohort. The result is intuitive in that those who are near the average age of NH entry seems
to have a better assessment of their risk type and are more likely to be confident about it.
To determine the impact of ex-ante degree of uncertainty on subsequent lapsing, I
perform policy simulation using the post-convergence parameter estimates. Specifically, I
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Table 1.7. The Learning model estimates
Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev.
ex-ante Uncertainty
Precision: ln(1/sigma_sqr) -0.604 (0.072) -0.035 (0.398)
sigma 1.354 (0.049) 1.036 (0.176)
Controls
ADLs 0.801 (0.381) 0.098 (0.102) 0.204 (0.190) 0.049 (0.022)
No. of conditions -1.388 (0.648) -0.171 (0.178) 0.042 (0.168) 0.010 (0.004)
IADLs 0.440 (0.465) 0.054 (0.056) 0.643 (0.206) 0.155 (0.069)
SRHS 0.232 (0.155) 0.029 (0.030) 0.016 (0.071) 0.004 (0.002)
Married -0.428 (0.283) -0.054 (0.055) -0.352 (0.189) -0.086 (0.037)
White -0.215 (0.373) -0.027 (0.027) -0.052 (0.268) -0.013 (0.005)
Female -0.311 (0.228) -0.038 (0.040) -0.187 (0.191) -0.045 (0.020)
Years of Education -0.045 (0.044) -0.006 (0.006) -0.051 (0.031) -0.012 (0.005)
Household Size 0.093 (0.124) 0.011 (0.012) -0.072 (0.112) -0.017 (0.008)
No. of Live Children 0.080 (0.039) 0.010 (0.010) 0.003 (0.036) 0.001 (0.000)
No. of Live Siblings 0.013 (0.046) 0.002 (0.002) -0.057 (0.041) -0.014 (0.006)
Age: pre-purchase 0.002 (0.020) 0.000 0.000 0.004 (0.012) 0.001 (0.000)
ADLs: pre-purchase -0.719 (0.499) -0.088 (0.092) 0.225 (0.302) 0.054 (0.024)
No. of Conditions: pre-purchase 0.123 (0.101) 0.015 (0.016) -0.012 (0.075) -0.003 (0.001)
IADLs: pre-purchase -0.685 (0.680) -0.084 (0.088) -0.663 (0.356) -0.160 (0.071)
Ln(household Income): pre-purchase 0.171 (0.149) 0.021 (0.022) 0.021 (0.100) 0.005 (0.002)
NH coverage only -0.246 (0.323) -0.029 (0.031) -0.099 (0.198) -0.024 (0.011)
HC coverage only 0.610 (0.385) 0.081 (0.077) 0.127 (0.229) 0.031 (0.013)
ln(Household wealth) -0.185 (0.082) -0.023 (0.024) -0.094 (0.054) -0.023 (0.010)
Owns Other pvt. Health Insurance Plan 0.194 (0.207) 0.024 (0.025) -0.531 (0.145) -0.125 (0.056)
Owns Life Insurance Policy -0.884 (0.267) -0.114 (0.110) -0.008 (0.137) -0.002 (0.001)
Ever Smoke 0.376 (0.232) 0.046 (0.048) -0.057 (0.169) -0.014 (0.006)
Medical Inflation 0.090 (0.074) 0.011 (0.011) -0.179 (0.051) -0.043 (0.019)
Intercept -2.325 (0.575) 1.352 (0.610)
No. of individual Obs.       635 493
Total no. of Obs.            2011 1462
Log of Marginal Likelihood  -16546 -3938
Predicted Probabilities     0.123 0.241
Std.Dev. of Pred. Prob.     0.128 0.107
Variables
Table 10: The Learning model estimates
Note: No. of iterations = 30,000. No. of burn-ins 15,000. Dummies for Census Divisions are included.
B. The AHEAD CohortA. The Original HRS Cohort
Simu. Marg. 
Eff.
Simu. Marg. 
Eff.Coefficients Coefficients
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Figure 1.3. Policy Simulation: The effect of initial uncertainty on lapse probability
Figure 6: Policy Simulation: The eﬀect of initial uncertainty on lapse probability
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compute equation (18) for three arbitrary values of perception bias in the initial subjective
probability: νi0 = −0.2, νi0 = 0, and νi0 = 0.2. Figure 1.3, panels (a), (b) and (c) show
the impact of initial degree of uncertainty on the predicted lapse probability for the two
separate cohorts and the whole sample, respectively. In all cases, higher degree of uncertainty
increases the likelihood of lapse regardless of the level of perception bias. For instance, in
the combined sample, panel (c), for those who overestimate their risk levels (i,e, νi0 > 0),
increasing their ex-ante degree uncertainty by 33% from σpˆi0 = 0.75 to σpˆi0 = 1 increases
the chance of subsequent lapse probability by 9 percentage points. On the other hand, for
the same magnitude of increase, lapse probability increases by about 12.5 percentage points
for those whose ex-ante subjective probabilities align with the objective levels (i.e, νi0 = 0)
and for those who underestimate (νi0 < 0). However, the impact varies by cohort in which
the effect is higher for respondents in the older compared to the younger cohort. The older
individuals perhaps predict their risk of entering a NH more precisely but the the effect of a
slight increase in their uncertainty is much sever compared to the younger cohort (panel (a)
vs. panel (b)).
1.5.3 Ex-post subjective probability
Tables D.2 - D.4 in Appendix D present estimation results on the effect of ex-post
subjective probability on lapse using different specifications. Table D.2 presents estimates
of a LPM using pooled OLS method. The first specification in row (1) does not control for
covariates. In specification (2), the coefficient is negative and significant when controls for
LTCI coverage types (such as NH care only, Home Care only and both NH and Home Care
coverage) and control for initial risk classification are included. To be more conservative,
the specification also includes the pre-purchase level of household income. Similar to the
results for the ex-ante subjective probabilities, those who ex-post believe to have a higher
chance of moving to a NH facility are less likely to lapse their policies. In all specifications,
which control for additional confounders, the coefficient remains to be significant for the
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Figure 1.4. Distribution of Estimated Individual Specific Marginal Effects
Figure 7: Distribution of Estimated Individual Speciﬁc Marginal Eﬀects
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Note: Distribution of mean of the posterior estimated Marginal Eﬀects of ex-post subjective probabilities for
each individual in the RC probit model (i.e, the model speciﬁed in equation (22))
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combined sample and the AHEAD cohort. However, it is insignificant for the HRS cohort
in all specifications but the last two.
Since endogeneity, possibly arising from unobserved individual heterogeneity, could bias
the OLS estimates, I estimate a linear RE and FE models. Tables D.3 and D.4 present the
results from these specifications. The coefficient from the LPM RE estimate in Table D.3
is significant for both the AHEAD and the Original HRS cohorts. On the other hand, the
FE estimate in Table D.3 is significant for all specifications and subsamples. An important
implication is that respondents in both cohorts change their beliefs over time. Similarly, the
estimated AMEs from the CRE probit model are significant and negative for all samples and
specifications.
Finally, Table D.4 presents the estimated marginal effects from the RC probit, which is
negative and significant for all subsamples. The estimates are closer to those obtained from
the CRE probit model. Furthermore, there is significant heterogeneity in lapse decision both
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on the responsiveness of lapse to the level of ex-post subjective probabilities and ex-post health
status. In a RC estimation using Bayesian estimation method the level of heterogeneity
can be measured by the square root of the diagonal elements of covariance matrix for the
individual-level coefficients. If the diagonal elements are statistically different form zero it
implies presence of heterogeneity. The posterior mean of estimated diagonal elements and
their standard deviations are shown in the bottom panel of Table D.4. For all individual-
level coefficients, the diagonal elements are all different from zero (i.e, within two standard
deviations). The same conclusion is graphically depicted in Figure 1.4, which shows the
degree of heterogeneity in the distribution of individual-level marginal effects. In general,
the results in the different specifications establish the expected negative relationship between
ex-post subjective probability and the decision to lapse.
1.6 Conclusion
High lapse rates observed in the first few years of private LTCI policy ownership has
been the subject of discussion in the literature recently. It implies a resumed exposure to the
risk of high LTC expenditure and loss of paid premiums for policyholders, and inefficiency
at the market level if lapsers are healthier than those remain in the pool. The primary
conjecture in the literature is that early lapsing is a result of the realization of ’mistake’
made in the original purchase. Drawing on the conjecture, this paper examines the effect
of policyholders’ prediction of their risk of needing LTC in the future, and their degree of
uncertainty surrounding them on lapse decisions. The central theme is that policyholders
make decisions on the basis of their subjective belief distributions, which is sufficiently char-
acterized by the their point prediction of the probabilities, and their degree of uncertainty
surrounding them. As their beliefs change so might their decisions to maintain or lapse their
policies.
Using a two-period insurance model with Bayesian learning, I show that policyholders
who ex-ante believe that they have a higher chance of needing LTC in the future are less
likely to subsequently lapse. However, as their uncertainties surrounding their ex-ante point
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predictions increase they are more likely to lapse even if they believe their risk is high.
Using data from the HRS and AHEAD cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study, I
estimate reduced-form specifications and a learning model specification of lapse. While the
reduced-form models estimate the effect of their ex-ante and ex-post point predictions of the
probabilities, the learning model estimate their ex-ante degree of uncertainty the impact on
lapse. Furthermore, I perform policy simulation to show the impact uncertainty on their
subsequent lapse decisions.
The results confirm that policyholders’ subjective probabilities and their uncertainties
surrounding them have a persistent but declining impact on the subsequent decisions to lapse
their LTCI policies. Those who ex-ante and ex-post believe to have a higher risk of needing
LTC in the future are less likely to lapse later on. However, regardless of the level of their
ex-ante point prediction, higher degree of uncertainties surrounding them increase the chance
of lapsing later on. However, the results are heterogeneous across individuals and cohorts.
In particular, the effect of ex-ante belief is strong among respondents in the younger cohort
who appear to have a higher degree of initial uncertainty compared to those in the older
cohort. In general, both policyholders’ point prediction of subjective probabilities and the
their uncertainties surrounding them have a persistent impact on the decisions to maintain
or lapse their LTCI policies. Because the LTCI market is dominated by individual as oppose
to group contracts, the plan features are relatively complex, and there is a widespread
financial illiteracy among the near elderly and elderly individuals the results in this study
have important policy implications. Specifically, fostering informed initial purchase decisions,
through information provision, financial advisory, etc., could reduce the risk of lapsing that
emanates from beliefs and uncertainty.
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Chapter 2
HEALTH AND INFORMAL RISK SHARING: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
Adverse health shocks are common phenomena in many communities. Individuals face
recurrent risk of illnesses, long-term health shocks such as disabilities, and deaths. Formal
private health insurance markets or public insurance systems are non-existent in these places.
The consensus in the literature is that, even in such environment, Pareto optimum could be
achieved if risk-averse individuals resort to informal risk sharing arrangements to help each
other. Such kind of risk sharing among non-altruistic individuals is voluntary on a quid pro
quo basis. Aid is provided today in exchange for a credible promise of future reciprocity.
However, limited commitment makes the first-best Pareto optimum unsustainable. In ad-
dition, availability of storage technologies in the form of grain, cash, livestock, and so forth
strengthen individuals’ ability to self-insure and hence increase the chance of deviation from
informal risk sharing arrangements (Ligon et al., 2002; A´braha´m and Laczo´, 2012). What is
less understood in the literature is that how individuals’ health capital and its productivity
affects the performance of informal risk sharing arrangements against health shocks.
Health capital has its own distinct features which the informal risk sharing literature
largely assumes way. First, individuals are endowed with health stock which serves as a stor-
age technology whose productivity is not perfectly known. Unlike other storage technologies
health stock entails inherent uncertainty with only so much of today’s stored value in the
form of health capital could be recovered in the next period making it an imperfect form
of storage technology. Second, individuals face imperfect information regarding the nature
of realized health shock and have difficulty to tell whether it is transitory (short-term) or
persistent (long-term). Third, health stock is a factor of production which affects current
level of income. These unique aspects of health need to be addressed when modeling informal
risk sharing against health risks, particularly in rural villages.
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In this paper, I study the extent to which informal risk sharing arrangements provide
insurance against health shocks with the above key features of health capital being taken
into account. I extend the standard two-sided limited commitment model with storage
technology to a regime where health endowment serves as a storage technology and is a
factor of production. Individuals can invest in their own and their partners health by making
transfers to each other. In the model, if adverse health shock is short-term it only affects
current income level through its effect on the number of sick days, and if it is long-term, it
also affects the next period level of health capital productivity. Moreover, individuals face
imperfect and possibly asymmetric information about the next period productivity of health
capital because it could be difficult to determine the nature of realized health shock as either
short-term or long-term.
The model predicts that the constrained Pareto optimal allocations are history depen-
dent through three channels. The first channel, similar to the results in other studies in the
literature, is through past participation constraints. It implies that whenever an individual’s
participation constraint binds she should be assigned a higher Pareto weight to prevent her
from defecting to autarky. This results in history dependence. The second channel is through
the relative ratios of health capital productivities. It states that an individual with higher
level of realized health capital productivity than the expected level should be assigned higher
a level of Pareto weight. The third channel is through the biological survival rate in that an
individual with higher survival rate should be assigned a higher weight to prevent her from
defecting. It implies that informal risk sharing against health shocks is less likely to be sus-
tainable among non-altruistic individuals with different levels of health capital productivities
(ex: able vs. disabled) and different levels of biological survival rates (ex: young vs. old.)
These results provide a plausible explanation for why the existing empirical evidence does
not support existence of informal risk sharing against health shocks among non-altruistic
agents.
Furthermore, optimal allocations vary depending on the set of information available
to individuals. Unlike shocks to income, which are usually observable and verifiable, health
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shocks are difficult to immediately determine as to whether they are short-term or long-term.
First, both individuals could face imperfect information since access to healthcare services
and hence verifying technology is limited. Second, even if the victim of a long-term health
shock has the knowledge, she has the incentive to keep it private or act as if the shock is
short-term. Because she knows that her partner has the incentive to renege on her when
she realizes that the shock is long-term and she is less likely to reciprocate in the future.
Third, the individual may prefer to keep the information private for fear of stigmatization
and social exclusion, which are common in many villages where individuals with diseases like
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and disabilities are more likely to be stigmatized.
The story behind informal risk sharing changes when motives other than insurance enter
into the picture. As also shown by De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011), motives other than
insurance such as altruism and social norms help individuals cope with health shocks. When
these motives are sufficiently large, participation constraints become irrelevant. Individuals
provide support without the expectation that the current recipient will reciprocate in the
future.
To characterize the main predictions of the model, I preform numerical analysis. The
results show that as the health capital of a non-altruistic individual increases the autarkic
expected lifetime utility increase as well, and risk sharing contract becomes less attractive.
This implies that informal risk sharing arrangement between two individuals with different
levels of health capital is less likely to be sustainable. In addition, as the biological survival
rate of one individual decreases, the variability of consumption and investment on health
for both individuals increases significantly undermining the role of informal risk sharing to
smooth consumption. Furthermore, the simulation results show that optimal consumption
and health investment paths vary depending on the information regime.
The empirical analysis focuses on testing key implications of the theoretical model using
panel data from rural Ethiopia. I estimate dynamic models which controls for endogeneity
and initial condition problem. Furthermore, in order to account for altruistic motives and
social norms, which relaxes the participation constraint, I estimate dynamic Seemingly Un-
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related Regression (SUR) model of transfers from senders of different social distances. Such
econometric specification allows for transfers from one sender type to be dependent on the
other. The empirical result supports that there is negative history dependence in trans-
fers among non-altruistic households in that household with past obligations receives lower
amount of transfer in the current period. On the contrary, there is positive history depen-
dence in transfers among households related along bloodline and kinship. Also, although aid
from benevolent formal institutions such as churches, mosques, and aid organizations con-
stitutes the bulk of transfers made to households in rural Ethiopia, it crowds out transfers
from altruistic individuals.
Finally, the empirical estimates show that neither short-term nor long-term health
shocks are insured through informal risk sharing arrangements among non-altruistic house-
holds. This result is similar with previous studies such as Dercon and Krishnan (2000)
who reject full-insurance against illnesses in southern rural Ethiopia. However, the result is
mixed when it comes to risk sharing along bloodline and kinship. While households with
negative long-term health shocks such as physical disabilities receives lower amount, those
with short-term health shocks, such as illnesses, receive higher amount of transfers from
their relatives. Although, individuals related to the household along bloodline provide some
insurance against short-term health shocks, they turn their face when the shock is long-term.
Yet, the same group of individuals makes more transfers to elderly households.
This paper is closely related to the recent studies by A´braha´m and Laczo´ (2012) and
De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011). The fundamentals are based on the seminal work of
Kimball (1988), which studies the scope for farmers’ cooperatives as risk sharing institutions
during medieval era in England and the subsequent theoretical studies, which demonstrate
the existence of self-enforcing mutual insurance contracts among non-altruistic risk-averse
agents (Coate and Ravallion (1993); Kocherlakota (1996); Ligon et al. (2002); Foster and
Rosenzweig (2001) among many). Empirical studies, which support the existence of risk
sharing among villagers, include help in times of bad harvest (Townsend, 1994), help in coping
with old-age security (Edmonds et al., 2005), assistance in times of death (Dercon et al.,
47
2006), and help in times of illness (De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2007, 2011). Furthermore,
the empirical results in this paper are similar to other studies which find altruism and social
norms as the main motives of sharing. These include sharing along family ties (Foster
and Rosenzweig, 2001), ethnic ties (Grimard, 1997), sharing among friends and families
(Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), and unreciprocated transfers for a chronically ill along kinship
line (De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011).
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the model
in a stochastic dynamic game framework. In Section 3, I perform numerical analysis to
characterize optimal allocations under different scenarios. Section 4 estimates the empirical
version of the model using actual data from rural Ethiopia and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Environment
Consider a closed economy inhibited by two infinitely-lived identical individuals i =
{1, 2} who are risk averse and maximize their lifetime utility. They are identical because they
have the same preferences and are endowed with the same exogenous random endowment
process. To fix ideas, let st denote the state realized in period t and s
t denote the history
of endowment processes, i.e. st = (s1, s2, . . . , st). Also, let individual 1 has income y1(s
t) in
state st whereas individual 2 has income y2(s
t), which is assumed to be independently and
identically (i.i.d.) distributed over time with probability Pr(st = s
j) = pij. Aggregate income
in all periods and states is assumed to be constant and is given by Y = y1(st) + y2(st), i.e.,
there is no aggregate uncertainty. However, the distribution of income among individuals
varies over time depending on the realization of history st.
Their preference is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtPr(st)u(ci(s
t)), 0 < β < 1, (2.1)
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where ci(s
t) is consumption of individual i in period t when history st has occurred, Pr(st)
is the probability of history st occurring, β is private discount rate, and E is the expectation
operator. The utility function u(·) satisfies u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0 with lim(x→0)u′(x) =∞.
Since individuals are risk averse, they are better-off involving in a risk sharing arrangement
as long as their endowments are not positively and perfectly correlated.
2.2.2 The Budget constraint
For the sake of simplicity, from now on I drop the notation st. Assuming no leisure,
each period each individual is endowed with 1 unit of time that is divided between time on
production activities l , and sick time, ψ. Hence, the time constraint is given by
lit + ψit = 1, (2.2)
Furthermore, assume that sick time is inversely related to health capital stock implying that
higher level of health capital reduces sick time. Hence, let sick time is given by
ψit = f(Hit), (2.3)
where f(Hit) is a function relating health capital stock with sick time, with f
′(Hit) < 0, which
implies that as health capital increases sick time decreases. Assume that each individual is
endowed with one unit of land and produce farm output which is also assumed to be equal
to income. Then income is given by
yit = 1− f(Hit). (2.4)
As the level of health capital increases farm output also increases and the marginal produc-
tivity of one unit of health capital is given by ∂yit
∂Hit
= −f ′(Hit) > 0. Assuming prices are
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normalized to one, the budget constraint can then be written as
cit +mit + τijt ≤ yit, (2.5)
where the right hand side is income in period t which can be consumed, cit, spent on private
health investment, mit, or transfer, τijt, to help fellow risk sharing partner j in ‘bad’ times.
2.2.3 Health Capital and Investment
Following Grossman (1972), I assume that individuals have to invest in their health in
order to produce. Also, health is an “investment good” and hence does not enter the utility
function (i.e., it is not a “consumption good”). Furthermore, following Go¨rtz and Tsoukalas
(2012), I assume that health capital has vintage properties in that health capital at different
ages is associated with different levels of productivity, qit. Investments on individual i’s health
come either from herself, mit, or her partner in the form of transfer, τjit. The accumulation
of health capital stock over time is given by
Hit+1 = δiHit + qit+1(mit + τjit), (2.6)
where δi is the biological survival rate (1 minus the depreciation rate), qit+1 is the next period
productivity of health capital. When individuals engage in a risk sharing arrangement with
transfer schedules τijt (i.e, transfer from i to j ) and τjit (i.e, transfer from j to i ), the
aggregate resource constraint can be written as
2∑
i=1
cit +
2∑
i=1
mit +
2∑
i 6=j
τijt ≤
2∑
i=1
yit, (2.7)
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where net transfers are summed to zero, i.e.
∑2
i 6=j τijt = 0. From (2.6), transfers can be
written as
τijt =
Hit+1 − δiHit
qit+1
−mit.
Then we have
0 =
2∑
i 6=j
τijt =
2∑
i=1
Hit+1 − δiHit
qit+1
−
2∑
i=1
mit. (2.8)
Assuming that aggregate resource is 1 and hence f(H1t) + f(H2t) = 1. Then, the aggregate
resource constraint can be simplified to take the following form
2∑
i=1
cit ≤ 1−
2∑
i=1
Hit+1 − δiHit
qit+1
. (2.9)
2.2.4 Imperfect Information and Bayesian Learning
De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011) define a health shock as transitory if it contains no
information about future shocks, and permanent or persistent if it does. This paper considers
health capital productivity shocks, qit+1, as long-term since it carries information regarding
the next period level of health capital productivity. On the other hand, short-term health
shocks are random shocks affecting sick time in the current period, ψit, which does not
contain information about future shocks.
I introduce a stochastic process in the storage technology through shocks to health
capital productivity, qit+1. Assume that the state of health capital productivity takes two
values, high value denoted by ηH in ‘good’ health state and low value denoted by ηL in ‘bad’
health state. Then the health capital productivity process can be parameterized as
qit+1 = ηit+1 + it+1, (2.10)
where ηit+1 is an ergodic two-state Markov process with ηit+1 ∈ {ηL, ηH}, and it+1 is noise
which is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance σ2 . Individuals enter period t with information
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set Ωijt ≡ {H ti , H tj , qti , qtj, ct−1i , ct−1j }, which comprises of all history. They observe the whole
history of q but not the state η or the noise η separately. That means, they face a kind of
signal extraction problem. However, individuals are assumed to know the distribution of the
noise as well as that the state variable follows an ergodic two-state Markov process with two
states and a transition matrix
Π =
 piHH piLH
piHL piLL
 ,
where pihl is the probability that the state of health capital productivity transits from state
h to state l, pihl ∈ (0, 1), and pihH + pihL = 1. Also, assume that the transition matrix is
symmetric so that any asymmetry in the resulting dynamics is endogenous. As a result of
the ergodicity and symmetry of the Markov process, the unconditional probabilities of η to
be in a certain state is 0.51. Conditional on their prior belief and the set of information, Ωijt,
individuals are assumed to form their expectations in a Bayesian fashion. Assuming that it
is normally distributed, the conditional probability of qit given low health productivity state
can be written as
p(qit|ηit = ηL) ∼ n
(
Et(qit|ηit = ηL), var(qit|ηit = ηL)
)
, (2.11)
where Et(qit|ηit = ηL) = Et[ηL + it] = ηL, and var(qit|ηit = ηL) = Et[(ηL + it)2]− (Et[ηL +
it])
2 = Et[(η
L)2 + 2ηLit + 
2
it] − (ηL)2 = σ2 . The conditional probability of qit given that
health capital productivity is in a ‘good’ state is obtained in a similar fashion. Then, using
1An ergodic two-state Markov chain process has exactly one eigenvalue, which is equal to one and all the
other eigenvalues are inside the unit circle. So the eigenvector associated with the unit eigenvalue is
p
[
ηt = η
H
ηt = η
L
]
=
[ 1−piLL
2−piHH−piLL
1−piHH
2−piHH−piLL
]
=
[
0.5
0.5
]
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Bayesian updating rule the posterior probability of ηt to be in a low state is given by
p(ηit = η
L|Ωit) = p(qit|ηit = η
L,Ωit)p(ηit = η
L)
(p(qit|ηit = ηL,Ωit)p(ηit = ηL) + p(qit|ηit = ηH ,Ωit)(1− p(ηit = ηL)))
(2.12)
The prior belief about the next period state of health capital productivity is given by
[
p(ηit = η
H |Ωit), p(ηit = ηL|Ωit)
]
Π =
[
p(ηit+1 = η
H |Ωit), p(ηit+1 = ηL|Ωit)
]
(2.13)
Equation (2.13) is individual i’s prior belief about the next period level of health productivity
before it is realized. Given their prior belief, individuals then form their expectations (i.e.,
calculate the expected value) about the productivity of health capital in the next period,
which is given by
q˜it+1 = Etη˜it+1, (2.14)
where η˜it+1 =
[
p(ηit+1 = η
H |Ωit), p(ηit+1 = ηL|Ωit)
]
Π. I assume that wherever i realizes a
health shock both i and j use the same Bayesian learning process (12)-(14) to form their ex-
pectations about their own as well as their partners’ next period health capital productivity.
2.2.5 Full commitment with Perfect information
I use a social planner’s approach as it is handy to deal with the dynamic stochastic
game problem outlined below. The same result can be achieved using a decentralized game
approach. Now, each individual’s problem of forming expectations about the next period
health productivity and solving the optimization problem becomes the planner’s problem.
That is, the social planner maximizes the utility of individuals by solving the following
standard stochastic dynamic programing problem
max
cit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
2∑
i=1
αiu(cit), ∀i, t (2.15)
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subject to the resource constraint (2.9), where αi is the Pareto weight assigned to each
individual with
∑2
i=1 αi = 1. The Planner’s problem can then be written in the following
Bellman equation formulation
W FCP (Hit, qt+1) = max{cit,Hit}2i=1
2∑
i=1
αiu(cit) + βE
[
W FCP (Ht+1, qt+2)
]
, (2.16)
subject to the resource constraint (2.9), where W FCP (·) denotes the value function under
full commitment and perfect information about the state of health capital productivity, qt+1.
The first order conditions for Pareto optimum is given by
u′(cit)
u′(cjt)
=
αj
αi
{
δj
δi
qjt
Eqjt+1
qit
Eqit+1
}
(2.17)
The result in (2.17) is similar to the standard risk sharing model of full commitment without
storage. The only difference is due to the term in the curly bracket. Since storage option in
the form of health capital stock is available to individuals, Pareto optimality implies that the
ratio of marginal utilities across all states and individuals must be equal to the product of
the ratio of the initial Pareto weights, the ratio of biological survival rates, and the ratio of
realized to expected health capital productivities. Hence, even if the participation constraint
is not introduced in the model the first best optimal allocation solution is history dependent
when health capital enters the model.
2.2.6 Full commitment with Imperfect Information
In the case of imperfect information, the planner observes the productivity of health
investment of each individual in period t, qit but not the next period level, qit+1. Instead, the
planner faces a signal extraction problem learns from the available informal in a Bayesian
fashion described above, which is given by q˜it+1. Thus, the planner’s problem in full com-
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mitment with imperfect information is to solve
W FCI(Hit, q˜t+1) = max{cit,Hit}2i=1
2∑
i=1
αiu(cit) + βE
[
W FCI(Ht+1, q˜t+2)
]
, (2.18)
subject to constraint (2.9) and the Bayesian learning process (2.13) and (2.14), where
W FCI(·) is the value function under full commitment with imperfect information. The first
order condition for optimum in this case is given by
u′(cit)
u′(cjt)
=
αj
αi
{
δj
δi
qjt
q˜jt+1
qit˜qit+1
}
(2.19)
where now Etqit+1 = q˜it+1. The interpretation of (2.19) is the same as (2.17) but the planner
now has uncertainty about the true productivity of health capital in the next period. There-
fore, whenever q˜it+1 6= qit+1, the optimal levels of consumption allocation under imperfect
information regime are different from that of prefect information.
2.2.7 Limited Commitment with Imperfect Information
The allocation schemes obtained in (2.17) under perfect information and in (2.19) under
imperfect information regimes rely on the assumption that the social planner enforces the
contract. However, such arrangement is difficult to implement due to lack of commitment
and enforcement mechanisms. At any time and in any state individuals may decide to
deviate and revert to autarky. Such difficulty in enforcement makes the first best solution
unsustainable. Hence, informal risk sharing contract is unsustainable without a self-enforcing
voluntary participation constraint (Thomas and Worrall (1988); Kocherlakota (1996), among
others.) This implies that informal risk sharing contracts should guarantee a lifetime utility
of at least the autarky level to voluntarily keep individuals in the risk sharing contract.
Furthermore, availability of health capital as a storage technology increases the ability to
self-insure and makes the outside option (deviation) attractive.
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The framework is similar to A´braha´m and Laczo´ (2012) model of efficient risk sharing
with limited commitment and storage option. However, unlike their model health capital
enters the model both as a storage technology and as a factor of production. Then, the social
planner’s problem is to solve
max
cit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
2∑
i=1
αiu(cit), (2.20)
subject to ∑2
i=1 cit ≤ 1−
∑2
i=1
Hit+1−δiHit˜qit+1 , ∀i, t {λt} (2.21)∑∞
r=1 β
r−tu(cir) ≥ V auti (Hit, q˜it+1), ∀i, r, t {µit} (2.22)
u′(cit) ≥ βEtu′(cit+1)
[
qit˜qit+1 δi + qitf ′(Hit)
]
, ∀i, t {ait} (2.23)
Hit ≥ 0. ∀i, t (2.24)
where V auti (Hit, q˜it+1) is the value of autarkic lifetime utility
2, λt, µit, and ait are the La-
grangian multipliers. Equation (2.21) is the aggregate resource constraint, equation (2.22) is
the participation constraint and equation (2.23) is individuals’ Euler equation which guar-
antees that agents have no incentive to deviate from the proposed allocation by storing in
their health capital privately. Introducing the participation constraint which also depends
on future decision values makes the use of standard dynamic stochastic optimization dif-
ficult. However, due to Marcet and Marimon (2011) the Lagrangian setup above can be
transformed into a Saddle-point formulation by introducing another co-state variable, µit,
which is the multiplier on the participation constraint. Then, the planner’s Saddle-point
2The autarkic value is the solution to V auti (Hit, q˜it+1) = max{cit,Hit}∞t=0 u(cit) + βE[V
aut
i (Ht+1, q˜it+2)]
subject to individual i’s budget constraint.
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problem can be recursively written as
WLCI(Ht, q˜t+1, µit) =
minµit≥µit−1 max{cit,Hit}2i=1{
∑2
i=1[(αi + µit+1)u(cit)
−(µit+1 − µit)V auti (Hit, q˜t+1)] + βE[WLCI(Ht+1, q˜t+2, µit+1)]}
(2.25)
subject to the resource constraint (2.21) , storage constraint (2.23) and the co-state variable
whose dynamics is recursively defined as
µit+1 = µit + κit, µi0 = 0, ∀i, t > 0 (2.26)
The co-state variable is just the sum of past multipliers on the participation constraint.
It increases with the number of times the participation constraint binds. A´braha´m and
Laczo´ (2012) show that if private storage technology has sufficiently high return, the storage
constraint always binds. The intuition is that individuals will use their health capital to self-
insure and the autarkic level of lifetime utility increases whenever the productivity of their
health capital as a means of storage increases. For instance, if we assume that q˜it+1 = 1,
then the return on health capital stock is 1 − δi (i.e. depreciation rate). It implies that
as the survival rate increases individuals have greater incentive to deviate. However, for
sufficiently low return (i.e, lower survival rate or higher depreciation rate) the constraints
do not bind. Assuming positive depreciation rate and hence δi < 1, it is safe to drop the
participation constraint (2.22). Then the optimal allocation with self-enforcing contract
satisfies the following first order conditions
0 = (αi + µit+1)u
′(cit)− λt, (2.27)
0 = (µit+1 − µit)∂V
aut
i (Hit, q˜t+1)
∂Hit
− λt
qit
+
λt+1
q˜it+1
δi, (2.28)
along with the budget constraint (2.21). Using Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) condition
for interior solution,
∂V auti (Hit,q˜t+1)
∂Hit
= u′(cit)(δi + f ′(Hit)), the condition for optimal allocation
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is given by
u′(cit)
u′(cjt)
=
(αj + µjt+1)δj
qjt
q˜jt+1
− µjtqjt(δj + f ′(Hjt))
(αi + µit+1)δi
qit˜qit+1 − µitqit(δi + f ′(Hit)) (2.29)
Equation (2.29) states the condition for constrained Pareto optimality for informal risk
sharing with limited commitment, imperfect information and storage option in the form of
health capital. The allocation weights assigned to individuals now depend on the multiplier of
the participation constraint, the ratio of current and expected health capital productivities,
the biological survival rates, and the marginal productivity of health capital in the production
of consumption goods.
Assuming that at the optimal level the marginal rate of health capital in reducing sick
time is just equal to the biological survival rate, i.e. δi = f
′(Hit), equation (29) can be
written as
u′(cit)
u′(cjt)
=
(αj + µjt+1)
(αi + µit+1)
{
δj
δi
qjt
q˜jt+1
qit˜qit+1
}
(2.30)
Equation (2.30) is similar to the optimal allocation weight in the standard limited commit-
ment risk sharing model except now the term in the curly bracket appears in the optimal
Pareto allocation condition. The standard limited commitment model states that the plan-
ner should increase the weight by exactly the amount of the multiplier so as to make the
individual with binding constraint stay in the contract. It implies that the weight assigned
to an individual increases if his participation constraint binds. However, in this model the
increase in allocation weight depends not only on whether the participation constraint binds
but also on the relative survival rates, and the relative ratios of the realized to expected
health capital productivities. It implies that an individual with higher survival rate should
be assigned with a higher weight, and similarly an individual with a higher realized than the
expected health capital productivity should be assigned with a higher weight.
The implication is that risk sharing with limited commitment and with health capital
as a storage technology is less likely to be sustainable among individuals with different levels
of biological survival rates and different levels of health capital productivity.
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2.2.8 Altruism and Social Norms
Although the theoretical results presented above show that a self-enforcing informal in-
surance scheme is less likely to provide insurance against health shocks among non-altruistic
individuals, empirical findings provide a strong support for the existence of some form of in-
surance against persistent and permanent health shocks (De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011).
The most important motives for insurance against persistent shocks without the promise
of future reciprocity are altruism and social norms. Altruism along blood line, clans, reli-
gious affiliation or neighbors is by far the most compelling motives empirically supported.
De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011) framework extends the standard model to accommodate
altruism by assuming that individual i derives subjective utility of size Vij > 0 from helping
individual j and vice versa, which could be a function of how close (genetically or socially)
they are. The participation constraint for i with altruism takes the form
∞∑
r=1
βr−tu(cir) ≥ V auti (Hit, qit+1)− Vij. (2.31)
If the level of altruism is sufficiently larger the promise of future reciprocity,
∑∞
r=1 β
r−tu(cir),
might not matter at all in order to provide help. This has an impact of reducing µit+1 in
equation (2.22) and/or making it irrelevant if altruism is sufficiently large.
2.3 Numerical Analysis
2.3.1 Calibration
Since deriving analytical solutions to (2.29)-(2.30) is difficult, I resort to characterizing
the optimal allocation through numerical computation. In this part, I focus on characterizing
the optimal allocation under different information regimes and different levels of survival
rates. For the sake of simplicity, I take on numerical analysis of the results of full commitment
model provided in equation (2.19) by ignoring the participation constraint. One difficulty
of calibrating the model for numerical analysis is that there are few studies which estimate
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Table 2.1. Calibration Parameter Values
β = 0.96 piHH = 0.75 σ = 0.10
α = 0.50 ηL = 0.90 κ = −0.10
δ = 0.97 ηH = 1.10
θ = 1.00 ρ = 0.85
the parameters for village communities under investigation. So, I calibrate the model using
parameters from macro literature that ensures convergence as well as other similar studies
in the literature such as Foster and Rosenzweig (2001).
Assume a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function given by
u(cit) =
c1−ρit
1− ρ, ρ > 0,
where ρ is the relative risk aversion coefficient. In order to compute the probability of a
state change in productivity of health capital, I follow Go¨rtz and Tsoukalas (2012) and
re-write the ergodic two-state Markov chain as an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter of
(2piHH−1) = 0.50. The probability of staying in the same state is piHH = piLL = 0.50+12 = 0.75
and the probability of state change is therefore piHL = piLH = 0.25. Furthermore, let shock to
health capital productivity is ±10% with ηL = 0.90 in the ‘bad’ health state and ηH = 1.10
iin the ‘good’ health state so that the expected value is unit. Furthermore, since shock affects
sick time in the current period, let the functional form of sick time is given by
ψit = H
−θ
it + κlog(ηit),
where θ is a parameter measuring the responsiveness of sick time to health capital, κ ≤ 0 is
the responsiveness of sick time in period t to health shocks. For instance, if κ = −0.1 a 10%
negative shock to health capital productivity increases sick time in period t by 1%. I set the
standard deviation of the noise to be 0.1. In addition, I set the biological survival rate at
0.97. The rest of the parameters used to calibrate the model are given in Table 2.1.
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The model is solved using value function iteration over discretized values of health
capital. I discretized health capital space into 199 grid points on the interval [(1− ξ)H, (1 +
ξ)H] by setting ξ = 0.20. I choose H = 2.00 for both individuals so that the aggregate output
produced given the parameters is equal to 1. Once the value function is maximized, I use
the optimal policy functions for consumption, health investment and transfers to simulate
the model 100 times over 50 periods.
2.3.2 Numerical and Simulation Results
Figure 2.1 shows the expected lifetime utilities under risk sharing arrangement and
autarky for different levels of individual 1 health capital. The autarkic level of expected
lifetime utility increases as health capital increases. Besides, lifetime utility is always higher
in a ‘good’ health states than ‘bad’ health states. The utility levels under risk sharing are
somewhere in between the autarkic ‘high’ and the autarkic ‘low’ and remains to be stable
even if health capital increases (panel (a)). As shown in panel (b), for lower levels of health
capital individual 1 is more likely to participate in a risk sharing arrangement. However, for
health capital above ≈ 2 autarky is better and the individual is more likely to deviate.
Figure 2.1. shows the level of signal noise and the expected health capital productivi-
ties for both individuals under two information regimes: perfect and imperfect. The optimal
time paths of income, consumption, investment (private plus transfers) on health, and health
capital stock for individual 1 and individual 2 are shown in Figure 2.2. The optimal time
paths vary depending on the set of information available to individuals. Even under autarky
individuals’ optimal decisions are different depending on the information available to them.
However, determining the impact of noise on the variances and mean levels of optimal con-
sumption and investment paths depends on the initial perception bias as well as the degree
of uncertainty that agents have. Regardless, consumption and investment levels oscillate in
the vicinity of optimal paths.
Finally, the simulation result shows that differing survival rates among partners have
important implication for informal risk sharing arrangement. Survival rate of individual 1
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Figure 2.1. Discounted Expected Lifetime Utility under and Autarky for different levels of
individual 1 health capital.
Figure 1: Discounted Expected Lifetime Utility under and Autarky for diﬀerent levels of
individual 1 health capital.
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affects the level and variability of consumption and health investments of both individuals.
As shown in Figure 2.3., higher biological survival rate of individual 1 implies higher con-
sumption levels but lower levels of investment on health capital. However, the variability of
consumption and health investment are non-linear in that for high levels of survival rates
the variances are lower whereas for survival rates between 0.7 and 0.88 the variances of
consumption and investment are higher.
2.4 Empirical Analysis: Data and Methods
In this part, I investigate whether informal risk sharing provides insurance to health
shocks in rural Ethiopia. In addition, I study how heterogeneity in biological survival rates
affects the nature of risk sharing in rural Ethiopia.
2.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use the longitudinal household data of Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS)3,
which is one of the longest ongoing household level panel survey data in Africa started
in 1989. The original survey includes seven villages. However, since 1994 the survey was
expanded to cover 15 peasant associations (PAs) in four national regions with a sample
size of approximately 1480 households. In this paper, I use the four rounds collected in
1994a, 1994b, 1995 and 1997. The sampling frame to select the villages was stratified in
the main agro-ecological zones and sub-zones, with one to three villages selected per strata.
The dataset includes detailed information regarding demographics, consumption variables,
health conditions, different shocks, incomes and farming activities, informal networks, and
transfers.
3The survey was conducted in collaboration with Economics Department, Addis Ababa University, De-
partment of Economics (AAU) and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), University of
Oxford. The funding for the survey was provided by Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC); Swedish
International Development Agency (SIDA); United States Agency for International Development (USAID);
and the World Bank.
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The dependent variable is logarithm of the amount of transfers the household received
in cash or in kind in the past four months. In kind transfers are converted to monetary values
using local commodity prices available in the dataset for each survey wave. The explanatory
variables measuring short-term and long-term shocks to health capital productivities include
household head’s number of physical disabilities and the number of days ill and unable to
work in the past four months. I use the size of total land and the value of livestock owned
as proxies for income and wealth. The logarithm of non-food expenditure is used as a proxy
for expenditures on health. Besides, education dummies control for private investment on
health, health behavior and household’s performance in the local labor market. Other set of
control variables include demographic characteristics such as household size, marital status
and sex.
Table 2.2. presents description and summary statistics of the variables and Tables E.1
- E.3 in Appendix E present detailed summary and description of the transfers.There is
high variation in the proportion of recipients across rounds which might be attributable to
agricultural seasons. For instance, only 8.4% households report to receive transfers whereas
about 34% of households received transfers in the past four months in round 2. On aver-
age about 21% of households received some form of assistance. Conditional on receiving
transfers (Table E.1), the average amount of receipts from Sender Type 1, Sender Type 2,
Sender Type 3 and Sender Type 4 are 113.66 Birr4, 107.93 Birr, 35.21 Birr and 140.41
Birr, respectively. The bulk of support come from benevolent institutions such as churches,
mosques, government and non-government aid organizations, which supports more than 60%
of recipients or 13% of households in the survey. This highlights the importance of insti-
tutional support in rural Ethiopia. The remaining 40% is from informal sources such as
non-resident family members, relatives, friends, neighbors, members of informal saving and
credit associations (Iddir and Iqqub). About 22% of recipient households report to receive
4Birr is the local currency in Ethiopia. According to the National Bank of Ethiopia the exchange rate
for 1 USD = 6.32 Birr in 1994 and 7.06 Birr in 1997/1998.
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transfers from non-resident family members and relatives underscoring the importance of
sharing along bloodline and kinship.
Since there are no direct measures of shocks to health capital productivities in the data,
I use the number of disabilities of household head and the number of days unable to work due
to illnesses as proxy measures for short-term and long-term shocks, respectively. About 26%
of household heads reported to have at least one physical disability. Reported disabilities
include: 1) difficulty to stand up from a seated position, 2) difficulty to sweep a floor, 3)
difficulty to walk independently for 5 km, 4) difficulty to carry 20 litters for 20 meters, and
5) difficulty to hoe a field in the morning. The average number of disability a household
head has is 0.7. On the other hand, the average household head is unable to work for 2 days
in a four months period due to illnesses. Conditional on being ill and unable to work, the
average household head losses above 12 work days5 in four months period or above 36 work
days in a year.
Another important variable of interest which appears in the model is the survival rate
(1 minus health capital depreciation rate) of the household. Again, direct measures are not
available in the data. So, I use household head’s age as a proxy for survival rates. Specifically,
I calculate δjt = 1−
(
agejt
min(age)+max(age)
)
for household j and δvt = 1−
(
agevt
min(age)+max(age)
)
for the
village so that δjt, δvt ∈ (0, 1), where agevt is village household heads average age in period t.
The minimum age in the data is 15 and the maximum is 120 but cap 8 observations which
are over 100 at 100 years.
2.4.2 Econometric Model
The empirical model is derived from the theoretical framework described in the previous
section. Given the nature of the dataset, which is discussed in the next section, I pursue
the following strategies. The unit of analysis is a household and henceforth denoted by
j. I estimate a recipient-level regression analysis, which uses information on the amount
5The number of days ill are right censored at 30 days. Censored observations account for 12.65% of
households who reported to be ill and unable to work. Hence, averages are biased downwards.
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Table 2.2. Variables Description and Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of all Transfers 0.878 1.793 0 7.638
Log of transfers excluding Religious/NGOs/Govt/Other 0.306 1.091 0 6.621
Log of transfers from Non-resident Family Members 0.054 0.497 0 5.956
Log of transfers from Other Relatives 0.167 0.842 0 6.621
Log of transfers from Friends/Neighbor/Iqqub/Iddir 0.094 0.564 0 5.303
Log of transfers from Religious/NGOs/Govt/Other 0.601 1.559 0 7.638
No. of Household Heads Disability (0/5) 0.731 1.414 0 5
No. of days Household Head was unable work due to illness 1.998 5.945 0 30
Household Size 5.911 2.969 1 25
Household Head is Male ( 1= male, 0 otherwise) 0.775 0.418 0 1
Age of Household Head 47.07 15.87 15 100
Household Head is Married: (1 = married, 0 otherwise) 0.749 0.434 0 1
Log of Non-food expenditure 3.72 1.283 0 7.818
Household Head's Education: Primary (1-6 Grade) 0.428 0.495 0 1
Household Head's education: Junior High (7-8) 0.028 0.166 0 1
Household Head's education: High school and above (>=9) 0.032 0.177 0 1
Size of land (hectare) 1.338 1.418 0 13.38
Log of Value of Livestock 5.747 3.045 0 11.25
Round 1: March - July 1994 1,475
Round 2: Sept. 1994 - Jan. 1995 1,464
Round 3: March - June 1995 1,460
Round 4: June - Nov. 1997 1,404
Total no. of observations 5803
Note: Number of disability is the sum of the following conditions: 1) difficulty to standup from 
seated position, 2) difficulty to sweep a floor, 3) difficulty to walk independently for 5 km, 4) 
difficulty to carry 20 litters for 20 meters, and 5) difficulty to hoe a field in a morning.
Table 2a: Variables Description and Summary Statistics
Description
Disabilities and Illnesses:
Demographic Characteristics and Assets:
No. of observations by survey year:
Transfers:
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of transfer household j receives from household i. Furthermore, following the argument in
Ligon et al. (2002), the two-agents game framework presented above is extended to a multi-
agents problem in a village setting. Therefore, the game is now between the village and
household j, where ij-pair replaced by vj-pair and v denoting the village.
The empirical specification is derived from the Euler equation in (2.30). For the sake
of simplicity, I assume exponential utility function of the form u(x) = −exp(−ρx), where x
is money. Furthermore, assume that household j has experienced a negative health shock
in period t then the condition for optimal allocation in (2.30) implies that v should transfer
τvjt to j. Substituting the respective budget constraints, cvt = yvt − mvt − τvjt and cjt =
yjt−mjt + τvjt, and taking the logarithm of both sides, the expression for transfer takes the
form
τvjt =
(yvt−yjt
2
)
+
(mjt−mvt
2
)
+ 1
2ρ
{
ln
(
αj+µjt+1
αv+µvt+1
)
+ ln (δj)− ln (δv) + ln
(
qjt
Etqjt+1
)
− ln
(
qvt
Etqvt+1
)}
,
(2.32)
where τvjt is the level of transfer household j receives in period t, yvt is village average
income, and yjt household income. Due to the presence of the multiplier of the participation
constraint and health capital productivities as well as survival rates in the planner’s Euler
equation, optimal allocation is history dependent. To account for such state dependence,
I estimate a dynamic model by including the lagged values of transfer as an additional
independent variable. Taking the lagged value of transfer as a summary measure of past
history is a common approach in the literature (such as Foster and Rosenzweig (2001);
Ayalew (2003)). Furthermore, let the biological survival rate be time-varying. Then, the
empirical model of transfer to household j can be written as
τvjt = αj + β1τvj,t−1 + β2yvt + β3yjt + β4Sjt + β5H˜vjt + γXjt + jt, (2.33)
where Sjt = ln (δj)− ln (δv) is the difference between household j the village average survival
rates, H˜vjt =
(
ln
(
qjt
Etqjt+1
)
− ln
(
qvt
Etqvt+1
))
is measure of the difference in health capital
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productivities between household j and the village average, Xjt is a vector of other control
variables including private health investment, mvt and mjt, and it is the error term assumed
to be i.i.d both crossectionally and over time, βs and γ are average coefficients to be estimated
and αj is household specific intercept capturing unobserved individual heterogeneity.
According to the result in the theoretical section, if there is limited commitment in
risk sharing β1 should be negative since the lagged value measures previous commitments.
The coefficient on village average income and own income are expected to be positive and
negative, respectively. In addition, since the model predicts that households with better
health capital productivities and biological survival rates receive higher amount of transfer
β4 and β5 should be positive.
2.4.3 Estimation Method
I estimate the model in (2.33) using different empirical specifications. The empirical
model is inherently dynamic as a result of history dependence. Estimating such model
poses a number of challenges. These include selecting the appropriate estimation method,
endogeneity, initial conditions problem, interdependence of transfer behavior among senders
of different social distances, and censoring of transfer amount due to corner solution. These
issues warrant a brief discussion.
The main candidates when dealing with endogeneity due to unobserved individuals ef-
fects is the FE approach, which wipes out such bias without imposing restricted distributional
assumptions. However, when the model is dynamic with short panel FE estimate is bias and
inconsistent. Nickell (1981) derived the analytical expression for the degree of bias and shows
that the bias is especially sever when T is small. For this reason, the common approach in
the literature is to use dynamic RE models. However, RE method also suffers from biases if
the unobserved individual effects are correlated with covariates and misspecification. Besides
imposing a restrictive distributional assumption we also need to deal with initial conditions
problem. In line with the Mundlak (1978b) and Chamberlain (1982) approach, Wooldridge
(2005) proposed a simple method to deal with endogeneity arising from correlation between
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lagged dependent variable and the contemporaneous error term as well as initial conditions
problem. The method is parametric and estimable using standard software routines such as
Stata. In the realm of this framework, the unobserved individual effects term is allowed to
be correlated with some of the covariates and the initial dependent variable, which is given
by
αj = θ1τj0 + θ2xj + uj, (2.34)
where uj ∼ n(0, σ2u), τj0 is the initial log of transfer, xj is a vector of over time mean
of selected time varying covariates. Since pre-survey information is not available, I use
the log of transfers in the first round as a proxy for initial conditions. Such approach
minimizes the initial conditions problem and biases arising from the correlation of unobserved
individual heterogeneity with some of the time varying covariates. Therefore, the first I
estimate specifications (2.33) with (2.34) using linear dynamic RE method for log of total
transfers from informal sources (non-resident family member, relatives, friends, neighbors,
and members of informal savings and credit associations (Iqqub and Iddir).
As discussed in the theoretical section since altruism and social norms might play im-
portant role, the model should account for different social distances. This could be achieved
by estimating separate regressions for transfers from Sender Type 1, Sender Type 2, Sender
Type 3 and Sender Type 4. However, transfers from one network type could depend on the
other. For instance, a relative may adjust the amount of transfer she makes if a non-resident
family member is making a transfer and vice-versa. Or a household seeks help from Sender
Type 2 because Sender Type 3 refused to or could not make transfers. For these reasons, the
third specification estimates a SUR model which explicitly allows for transfers from different
sender types to be correlated. This specification is given by
τmj,t = αmj + β1mτmj,t−1 +
∑
m 6=n
β2nτnj,t−1 + β3myvt + β4myjt + β5mSjt
+ β6mH˜jt + γmXjt + mjt,
(2.35)
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where τmj,t is the logarithm of transfer amount made from sender type m = {1, 2, 3, 4} ,
m = 1 denotes transfer from non-resident family member, m = 2 denotes transfer from a
relative, m = 3 denotes transfer from a friend, a neighbor, or informal associations such as
Iqqub or Iddir and others, and m = 4 denotes transfers from benevolent institutions such as
church, mosque, government or non-government aid organizations. The potential correlation
between the decisions of different senders can now be handled through the correlation of
error terms as follow
jt ∼ N4 [04×1,σ4]
and
αmj = θm1τmj,0 + θm2xmj + umj, (2.36)
where jt is a 4 × 1 vector of error terms for household j, σ is the covariance matrix and
σmn is the covariance between transfer decision made by sender type m and sender type n.
Then this model can be estimated using Stata routine (xtsur) provided by Nguyen (2008).
The last estimation issue is that censoring due to corner solutions, which is common in
many applications including hours worked, charitable contributions, etc. In our case, there is
significant “pile-up” of transfers at zero because for about 80% of the observations transfers
are zero. Such kind of censoring results in exaggerated slope estimates commonly referred
to as expansion bias (Rigobon and Stoker, 2007). This implies exaggerated estimates of
the slope coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, which is also censored. In the spirit
of the approach in Wooldridge (2005), Li and Zheng (2008) propose dynamic Tobit using
Semiparametric Bayesian approach in a single equation problem. Although, the dynamic
Tobit model is a better approach to deal with censoring there are no standard software
routines available to estimate the SUR version of it.
Hence, in this paper, for the sake of comparison of the coefficients across single equation
estimates and SUR estimates as well as simplicity, the main approach is the linear dynamic
RE method. Linear estimation method is also the approach adopted in similar studies such as
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De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011). However, cognizant of such problem I conduct sensitivity
analysis by estimating single equation Linear Probability Model using binary dependent
variables and panel Tobit model.
2.5 Empirical Analysis: Results and Discussions
In this section I discuss the main findings related to whether there is history dependence
in transfers, whether informal risk sharing provides insurance against short-term and long-
term health shocks, how risk sharing varies by social distances (degree of altruism) and how
different sender types interact with each other. The results are presented in Tables (2.3) to
(2.6). All specifications are dynamic and stationary and ergodic (i.e., |β1| ≤ 1). The models
are variants of Mundlak-Chamberlain RE framework, which controls for potential correla-
tion between the unobserved heterogeneity and covariates and initial conditions problem in
the framework of Wooldridge (2005). The Munlak-Chamberlain approach is justified in all
specifications because some of the coefficients on the time-mean variables are statistically
significant.
2.5.1 History Dependence
As shown in Table (2.3), the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and
significant in all specifications, which is against what the theory predicts. Estimating the
Mundlak-Chamberlain type model (panel 2) does little to shift the direction of the coefficient.
The result remains positive and statistically significant when survey round dummies and
village dummies are included. As shown in column (4), the elasticity of receiving transfers
from informal sources next period with respect to current amount of transfer is 0.087. A
plausible explanation for such positive history dependence is that maybe altruistic motive
and social norms are dominating the insurance motive.
To uncover such motives, I estimate separate regressions for senders of different social
distances. Table (2.4) shows the results corresponding to the four sender types. The first
two columns are regression results of log transfers from Sender Type 1 (non-resident family
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Table 2.3. Estimation Results I: Long-Term Health Shocks
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Table 5: Estimation Res ts I: Long-Term Health Shocks  
Method: Linear Dynamic Random Effects Estimates: 
Dependent variable: Log of transfer amount 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged: log (Transfer) 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.087*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Difference: Long-term health shocks -0.001 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Difference: Survival Rates -0.391*** -0.956 -0.929 -0.828 
 (0.141) (0.619) (0.619) (0.601) 
Log (nonfood expenditure) 0.038** 0.037* 0.038* 0.071*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Male Household Head -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.194*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
Household Size 0.018*** -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Married 0.025 0.039 0.038 0.021 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) 
Size of land owned (hectare) -0.045*** -0.049 -0.051* -0.046 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Log (Value of Livestock ) -0.009 0.017 0.013 0.017 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Education: Primary  -0.179*** -0.150*** -0.067 -0.086 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.057) (0.057) 
Education: Junior High  -0.244** -0.220** -0.138 -0.209** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.105) (0.103) 
Education: High school and Above  -0.128 -0.112 -0.031 -0.166 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.114) (0.113) 
Constant 0.550*** 0.488*** 0.513*** 0.641*** 
 (0.059) (0.087) (0.088) (0.143) 
     
Initial Conditions No Yes Yes Yes 
Time Means No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Village Dummies No No No Yes 
No. of Observations 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 
Number of Households 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Difference in long-term health 
shocks is the difference in the number of disabilities: (No. of disabilities for household ݆ in round	ݐ) - 
(Average no. of disabilities for village ݒ in round	ݐ).  Difference in Survival Rates is the difference in the 
level of survival: (Survival rate for household ݆ in round	ݐ) – (Average survival rate for village ݒ in 
round	ݐ). Time means include mean of the difference in long-term health shocks, mean of the difference 
in survival rates, log (non-food expenditure), Household size, Size of Land owned (hectare) and 
Log(Value of livestock).  
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Table 2.4. Estimation Results II: Long-Term Health Shocks
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Table 6: Estimation Results II: Long-Term Health Shocks 
Method: Linear Dynamic Random Effects Estimate  
Dependent Variables: Log transfer amount from Senders Type1 – Type 4. 
VARIABLES (1) 
Sender 
Type 1 
(2) 
Sender 
Type 2 
(3) 
Sender  
Type 3 
(4) 
Sender  
Type 4 
     
Lagged: log (Transfer) 0.081*** 0.070*** -0.049** -0.287*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) 
Difference: Long-term health shocks 0.002 -0.015 -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.020) 
Difference: Survival Rates -0.283 -0.436 -0.126 -0.494 
 (0.288) (0.459) (0.311) (0.753) 
Log (nonfood expenditure) 0.018 0.028 0.029** -0.031 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.029) 
Male Household Head -0.017 -0.190*** 0.024 0.049 
 (0.031) (0.050) (0.034) (0.082) 
Household Size 0.017* 0.027* -0.104*** -0.068*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.024) 
Married 0.002 -0.004 0.008 -0.054 
 (0.031) (0.049) (0.033) (0.081) 
Size of land owned (hectare) -0.011 -0.041* 0.001 -0.075** 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.037) 
Log (Value of Livestock) 0.002 0.002 0.014** -0.023 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) 
Education: Primary (1-6 Grade) -0.011 0.014 -0.083*** -0.175** 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.029) (0.071) 
Education: Junior High (7-8) -0.007 -0.037 -0.171*** -0.208 
 (0.049) (0.079) (0.053) (0.129) 
Education: High school and Above (>=9) -0.055 0.036 -0.163*** -0.159 
 (0.054) (0.086) (0.059) (0.142) 
Constant 0.185*** 0.204* 0.287*** -0.330* 
 (0.069) (0.109) (0.074) (0.180) 
     
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Means Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 
Number of Households 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Difference in long-term health 
shocks is the difference in the number of disabilities: (No. of disabilities for household ݆ in round	ݐ) - 
(Average no. of disabilities for village ݒ in round	ݐ).  Difference in Survival Rates is the difference in the 
level of survival: (Survival rate for household ݆ in round	ݐ) – (Average survival rate for village ݒ in 
round	ݐ). Time means include mean of the difference in long-term health shocks, mean of the difference 
in survival rates, log (non-food expenditure), Household size, Size of Land owned (hectare) and 
Log(Value of livestock).  
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member) and from Sender Type 2 (relatives), which are the closest to the household in terms
of social distance. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variables in these equations
are positive and statistically significant implying that there is positive history dependence
in transfers along bloodline. The elasticity of receiving a Birr from non-resident family
members and relatives next period with respect to current amount of transfer is 0.08 and
0.07, respectively.
However, when social distance increases from bloodline and kinship to other relation-
ships such as friends, neighbors, members of informal associations (Sender Type 3) and
benevolent formal institutions (Sender Type 4), the coefficients on the lagged dependent
variables reverse sign and become negative and statistically significant. This result supports
the theoretical prediction of negative history dependence among non-altruistic risk shar-
ing partners. A household which received aid from Sender Type 3 this period will receive
lower amount of transfer in the next period. The elasticity is −0.05 meaning that when the
amount of transfer received from a friend in the current period increases by 1%, the next
period amount from the same friend decreases by 0.05%. Formal institutions also discourage
dependency and reduce the amount of transfer they make to the same household in the
next period. If the current amount of transfers from these institutions increases by 1% the
amount the household receives in the next period decreases by 0.29%.
As briefly discussed above, estimating four seemingly unrelated equations separately
could lead to biased and inefficient estimates since their errors could be correlated. This
is of particular interest since senders of different social distances could adjust their transfer
behavior depending on the other sender. Table (2.7) presents the estimation results of
the dynamic SUR model which accounts for such correlations. In this specification, the
magnitude of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables for Sender Type 1 and
Sender Type 2 has significantly increased. While the coefficient for Sender Type 3 has
slightly declined, the coefficient for Sender Type 4 remains to be the same both in terms of
magnitude and direction but now with higher level of efficiency.
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Table 2.5. Estimation Results I: Short-Term Health Shocks
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Table 7: Estimation esults I: Short-Te m Health Shocks 
Method: Linear Dynamic Random Effects Estimates: 
Dependent variable: Log of transfer amount 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged: log (Transfer) 0.149*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.087*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Difference: Short-term health shocks 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Difference: Survival Rates -0.380*** -0.916 -0.891 -0.788 
 (0.136) (0.619) (0.619) (0.600) 
Log (nonfood expenditure) 0.037** 0.037* 0.038* 0.072*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Male Household Head -0.237*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.198*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
Household Size 0.019*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Married 0.026 0.043 0.042 0.026 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) 
Size of land owned (hectare) -0.042*** -0.049 -0.051* -0.046 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Log (Value of Livestock ) -0.009 0.017 0.014 0.017 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Education: Primary (1-6 Grade) -0.178*** -0.149*** -0.065 -0.083 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.057) (0.057) 
Education: Junior High (7-8) -0.236** -0.221** -0.138 -0.209** 
 (0.096) (0.095) (0.105) (0.103) 
Education: High school and Above (>=9) -0.117 -0.115 -0.032 -0.168 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.114) (0.113) 
Constant  0.555*** 0.488*** 0.513*** 0.644*** 
 (0.059) (0.087) (0.088) (0.143) 
     
Initial Conditions No Yes Yes Yes 
Time Means No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Village Dummies No No No Yes 
Observations 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 
Number of Household 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Difference in Short-Term Health 
Shocks is the difference in the number of days ill and unable to work: (No. of days ill and unable to work 
for household ݆ in round	ݐ) - (Average no. of days ill and unable to work for village ݒ in round	ݐ).  
Difference in Survival Rates is the difference in the level of survival: (Survival rate for household ݆ in 
round	ݐ) – (Average survival rate for village ݒ in round	ݐ). Time means include mean of the difference in 
short-term health shocks, mean of the difference in survival rates, log (non-food expenditure), Household 
size, Size of Land owned (hectare) and Log(Value of livestock).  
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Table 2.6. Estimation Results II: Short-Term Health Shocks
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Table 8: Estimation ults II: Short-Term Health Shocks 
Method: Linear Dynamic Random Effects Estimate  
Dependent Variables: Log transfer amount from Senders Type1 – Type 4. 
VARIABLES Sender  
Type 1 
Sender  
Type 2 
Sender  
Type 3 
Sender  
Type 4 
     
Lagged: log (Transfer) 0.091*** 0.068*** -0.042** -0.263*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) 
Difference: Short-term health shocks 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Difference: Survival Rates -0.282 -0.398 -0.105 -0.516 
 (0.288) (0.458) (0.311) (0.756) 
Log (nonfood expenditure) 0.019* 0.029 0.029** -0.033 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.030) 
Male Household Head -0.019 -0.192*** 0.021 0.017 
 (0.031) (0.050) (0.034) (0.082) 
Household Size 0.018** 0.028* -0.103*** -0.070*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.024) 
Married 0.003 -0.000 0.012 -0.025 
 (0.031) (0.049) (0.033) (0.081) 
Size of land owned (hectare) -0.011 -0.041* 0.001 -0.072* 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.037) 
Log (Value of Livestock) 0.001 0.002 0.013** -0.022 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) 
Education: Primary (1-6 Grade) -0.014 0.017 -0.081*** -0.176** 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.029) (0.072) 
Education: Junior High (7-8) -0.013 -0.037 -0.170*** -0.209 
 (0.049) (0.079) (0.053) (0.130) 
Education: High school and Above (>=9) -0.060 0.035 -0.161*** -0.152 
 (0.054) (0.086) (0.059) (0.143) 
Constant 0.184*** 0.204* 0.295*** -0.283 
 (0.069) (0.109) (0.074) (0.181) 
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Means Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 
Number of Households 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Difference in Short-Term Health 
Shocks is the difference in the number of days ill and unable to work: (No. of days ill and unable to work 
for household ݆ in round	ݐ) - (Average no. of days ill and unable to work for village ݒ in round	ݐ).  
Difference in Survival Rates is the difference in the level of survival: (Survival rate for household ݆ in 
round	ݐ) – (Average survival rate for village ݒ in round	ݐ). Time means include mean of the difference in 
short-term health shocks, mean of the difference in survival rates, log (non-food expenditure), household 
size, Size of Land owned (hectare) and Log(Value of livestock).  
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Table (2.8) present estimation results for the full specification of the model given in
equation (2.35) with (2.36). In this specification the lagged values of transfers from other
sender types are included along with own lagged dependent variables. The elasticities of
receiving transfers from socially close senders such as non-family members and relatives are
now 0.19 and 0.12, respectively, whereas the elasticities of receipts from senders Type 3 and
Type 4 are −0.04 and −0.29, respectively, which are in line with the theoretical results.
2.5.2 Health Shocks and Risk Sharing
According to the theoretical model the coefficients on the deviations of measures of
health capital productivities and the survival rates from the village means should be positive.
This means that individuals with higher health capital productivities should receive higher
transfers. For instance, if two non-altruistic individuals are engaged in a voluntary risk
sharing arrangement, the one with physical disability receives lower (sends higher) amount
of transfer from (to) his partner. While Tables (2.3) and (2.4) present results from the single
equation estimation when shocks to health capital productivities are long-term, Tables (2.5)
and (2.6) presents the results when the measures are short-term. Tables (2.7) and (2.8)
present results from the SUR model.
In the single equation specifications, Tables (2.3) and (2.4), there is no evidence that
supports informal risk sharing against long-term health shocks measured in terms of phys-
ical disabilities. Although the coefficient for Sender Type 3 (non-altruistic relationship)
is negative in line with what the theory predicts it is statistically insignificant. Similarly,
from these specifications there is no evidence that individuals related to households along
bloodline make transfers in response to adverse long-term health shocks. The same is true
for formal benevolent institutions. However, when the specification is estimated using the
SUR model, Tables (2.7) and (2.8), the coefficient now turns to be statistically significant
for transfer from relatives (Sender Type 2). This implies that individuals related to the
household along bloodline make lower amount of transfer when the household has long-term
disability compared to the village average.
79
38
 
 
Ta
ble
 9:
 E
sti
ma
tio
n R
esu
lts
 of
 L
ine
ar 
Dy
na
mi
c S
UR
 m
od
el 
I 
De
pe
nd
en
t V
ari
ab
les
: L
og
 tr
an
sfe
r a
mo
un
t f
rom
 Se
nd
ers
 T
yp
e1
 – 
Ty
pe
 4.
 
VA
RI
AB
LE
S 
Se
nd
er 
Ty
pe
 1 
 
Se
nd
er 
Ty
pe
 2 
 
Se
nd
er 
Ty
pe
 3 
 
Se
nd
er 
Ty
pe
 4 
 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
 
 
(4)
 
(5)
 
(6)
 
 
(7)
 
(8)
 
(9)
 
 
(10
) 
(11
) 
(12
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
ne
l (a
): 
Lo
ng
-T
er
m 
He
alt
h S
ho
ck
s (
No
. o
f D
isa
bil
iti
es)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La
gg
ed
: lo
g (
Tr
an
sfe
r) 
0.2
20
**
* 
0.2
16
**
* 
0.1
91
**
* 
 
0.1
28
**
* 
0.1
28
**
* 
0.1
25
**
* 
 
-0.
02
8 
-0.
02
8 
-0.
03
6*
* 
 
-0.
26
0*
**
 
-0.
26
4*
**
-0.
29
1*
**
 
 
(0.
02
3) 
(0.
02
5) 
(0.
02
8) 
 
(0.
00
6) 
(0.
00
6) 
(0.
00
6) 
 
(0.
01
7) 
(0.
01
7) 
(0.
01
8) 
 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
00
4) 
Di
ff.
: L
on
g-t
erm
 he
alt
h s
ho
ck
s 
-0.
00
2 
-0.
00
6 
-0.
00
6 
 
-0.
00
8*
* 
-0.
01
4*
**
 
-0.
01
4*
**
  
-0.
00
6 
0.0
02
 
0.0
02
 
 
0.0
04
 
-0.
00
6 
-0.
00
5 
 
(0.
01
0) 
(0.
01
2) 
(0.
01
2) 
 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
00
5) 
(0.
00
5) 
 
(0.
00
6) 
(0.
00
7) 
(0.
00
7) 
 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
00
5) 
(0.
00
5) 
Di
ff.
: S
urv
iva
l R
ate
s 
-0.
00
3 
-0.
20
2 
-0.
16
8 
 
-0.
29
1*
**
 
-0.
42
3*
* 
-0.
40
5*
* 
 
0.0
31
 
-0.
06
4 
-0.
07
3 
 
0.0
24
 
-0.
37
3*
* 
-0.
35
3*
 
 
(0.
09
2) 
(0.
46
1) 
(0.
45
8) 
 
(0.
03
8) 
(0.
17
2) 
(0.
17
2) 
 
(0.
06
2) 
(0.
26
5) 
(0.
26
5) 
 
(0.
03
7) 
(0.
18
0) 
(0.
18
0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
ne
l (b
): 
Sh
or
t-T
er
m 
He
alt
h S
ho
ck
s (
No
. o
f D
ay
s u
na
ble
 to
 w
or
k d
ue
 to
 ill
ne
sse
s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La
gg
ed
: lo
g (
Tr
an
sfe
r) 
0.2
21
**
* 
0.2
16
**
* 
0.1
91
**
* 
 
0.1
28
**
* 
0.1
27
**
* 
0.1
24
**
* 
 
-0.
02
7 
-0.
02
8 
-0.
03
5*
 
 
-0.
26
0*
**
 
-0.
26
4*
**
-0.
29
1*
**
 
 
(0.
02
3) 
(0.
02
5) 
(0.
02
7) 
 
(0.
00
6) 
(0.
00
6) 
(0.
00
6) 
 
(0.
01
7) 
(0.
01
7) 
(0.
01
8) 
 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
00
4) 
Di
ff.
: S
ho
rt-
ter
m 
he
alt
h s
ho
ck
s 
-0.
00
1 
0.0
01
 
0.0
00
 
 
0.0
03
**
* 
0.0
06
**
* 
0.0
06
**
* 
 
-0.
00
2 
-0.
00
0 
-0.
00
1 
 
0.0
04
**
* 
-0.
00
2*
 
-0.
00
1 
 
(0.
00
2) 
(0.
00
3) 
(0.
00
3) 
 
(0.
00
1) 
(0.
00
1) 
(0.
00
1) 
 
(0.
00
1) 
(0.
00
2) 
(0.
00
2) 
 
(0.
00
1) 
(0.
00
1) 
(0.
00
1) 
Di
ff.
: S
urv
iva
l R
ate
s 
-0.
02
6 
-0.
05
2 
-0.
03
9 
 
-0.
25
3*
**
 
-0.
36
1*
* 
-0.
34
3*
* 
 
0.0
24
 
-0.
08
2 
-0.
08
7 
 
0.0
31
 
-0.
37
6*
* 
-0.
35
0*
 
 
(0.
08
8) 
(0.
46
0) 
(0.
45
8) 
 
(0.
03
7) 
(0.
17
2) 
(0.
17
2) 
 
(0.
05
9) 
(0.
26
5) 
(0.
26
5) 
 
(0.
03
5) 
(0.
18
0) 
(0.
18
0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ti
me
 M
ea
ns
 
No
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
No
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
No
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
No
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ini
tia
l C
on
dit
ion
s 
No
 
No
 
Ye
s 
 
No
 
No
 
Ye
s 
 
No
 
No
 
Ye
s 
 
No
 
No
 
Ye
s 
Vi
lla
ge
 D
um
mi
es 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s i
n p
are
nth
ese
s, 
**
* p
<0
.01
, *
* p
<0
.05
, *
 p<
0.1
 
          
 
T
ab
le
2.
7.
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
L
in
ea
r
D
y
n
am
ic
S
U
R
m
o
d
el
I
,
80
39
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
10
: E
st
im
at
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 o
f L
in
ea
r D
yn
am
ic
 S
U
R
 m
od
el
 II
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
: L
og
 tr
an
sf
er
 a
m
ou
nt
 fr
om
 S
en
de
rs
 T
yp
e1
 –
 T
yp
e 
4.
 
V
A
RI
A
BL
ES
 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
1 
 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
2 
 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
3 
 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
4 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
 
(1
0)
 
(1
1)
 
(1
2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
ne
l (
a)
: L
on
g-
Te
rm
 H
ea
lth
 S
ho
ck
s (
N
o.
 o
f D
isa
bi
lit
ie
s)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r)
 S
en
de
r T
yp
e 
1 
0.
21
1*
**
 
0.
20
8*
**
 
0.
18
3*
**
 
 
0.
13
1*
**
 
0.
13
1*
**
 
0.
13
2*
**
 
 
0.
05
5*
**
0.
05
1*
**
 
0.
05
1*
**
 
 
-0
.0
69
**
* 
-0
.0
75
**
*
-0
.0
72
**
* 
 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
28
) 
 
(0
.0
1)
 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
16
) 
(0
.0
16
) 
 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r)
 S
en
de
r T
yp
e 
2 
0.
08
9*
**
 
0.
08
9*
**
 
0.
09
0*
**
 
 
0.
12
3*
**
 
0.
12
3*
**
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
 
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
7*
**
 
0.
02
6*
**
 
 
0.
02
0*
**
 
0.
02
0*
**
 
0.
02
1*
**
 
 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r) 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
3 
0.
02
7 
0.
02
5 
0.
02
1 
 
0.
02
6*
* 
0.
02
5*
* 
0.
02
6*
* 
 
-0
.0
36
**
 
-0
.0
36
**
 
-0
.0
44
**
 
 
0.
00
2 
0.
01
2 
-0
.0
03
 
 
(0
.0
29
) 
(0
.0
29
) 
(0
.0
29
) 
 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.0
11
) 
 
(0
.0
17
) 
(0
.0
17
) 
(0
.0
18
) 
 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r) 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
4 
-0
.0
16
* 
-0
.0
15
 
-0
.0
12
 
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
03
3*
**
 
 
0.
00
7 
0.
00
7 
0.
00
6 
 
-0
.2
61
**
* 
-0
.2
64
**
*
-0
.2
91
**
* 
 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
D
iff
.: 
Lo
ng
-te
rm
 h
ea
lth
 sh
oc
ks
 
-0
.0
01
 
-0
.0
03
 
-0
.0
03
 
 
-0
.0
08
**
 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
 
-0
.0
05
 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
3 
 
0.
00
4 
-0
.0
07
 
-0
.0
06
 
 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
07
) 
(0
.0
07
) 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
D
iff
.: 
Su
rv
iv
al
 R
at
es
 
0.
02
1 
-0
.1
28
 
-0
.1
06
 
 
-0
.2
93
**
*
-0
.3
66
**
 
-0
.3
44
**
 
 
0.
03
1 
-0
.0
59
 
-0
.0
60
 
 
0.
03
0 
-0
.3
69
**
 
-0
.3
39
* 
 
(0
.0
92
) 
(0
.4
61
) 
(0
.4
58
) 
 
(0
.0
38
) 
(0
.1
71
) 
(0
.1
71
) 
 
(0
.0
62
) 
(0
.2
64
) 
(0
.2
64
) 
 
(0
.0
37
) 
(0
.1
81
) 
(0
.1
81
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
ne
l (
b)
: S
ho
rt
-T
er
m
 H
ea
lth
 S
ho
ck
s (
N
o.
 o
f D
ay
s u
na
bl
e 
to
 w
or
k 
du
e 
to
 il
ln
es
se
s)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r)
 S
en
de
r T
yp
e 
1 
0.
21
2*
**
 
0.
20
7*
**
 
0.
18
3*
**
 
 
0.
13
0*
**
 
0.
13
3*
**
 
0.
13
3*
**
 
 
0.
05
5*
**
0.
05
0*
**
 
0.
05
1*
**
 
 
-0
.0
71
**
* 
-0
.0
75
**
*
-0
.0
74
**
* 
 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
27
) 
 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
 
(0
.0
16
) 
(0
.0
16
) 
(0
.0
16
) 
 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r) 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
2 
0.
08
9*
**
 
0.
08
8*
**
 
0.
09
0*
**
 
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
0.
12
3*
**
 
0.
12
0*
**
 
 
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
6*
**
 
0.
02
6*
**
 
 
0.
01
9*
**
 
0.
02
1*
**
 
0.
02
1*
**
 
 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r) 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
3 
0.
02
5 
0.
02
1 
0.
01
8 
 
0.
02
7*
* 
0.
02
6*
* 
0.
02
7*
* 
 
-0
.0
36
**
 
-0
.0
36
**
 
-0
.0
44
**
 
 
0.
00
2 
0.
01
1 
-0
.0
03
 
 
(0
.0
29
) 
(0
.0
29
) 
(0
.0
29
) 
 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.0
11
2)
 
 
(0
.0
17
) 
(0
.0
17
) 
(0
.0
18
) 
 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
La
gg
ed
: l
og
 (T
ra
ns
fe
r) 
Se
nd
er
 T
yp
e 
4 
-0
.0
16
* 
-0
.0
12
 
-0
.0
10
 
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
03
3*
**
 
 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
6 
 
-0
.2
61
**
* 
-0
.2
64
**
*
-0
.2
92
**
* 
 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
D
iff
.: 
Sh
or
t-t
er
m
 h
ea
lth
 sh
oc
ks
 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
1 
 
0.
00
3*
**
 
0.
00
6*
**
 
0.
00
6*
**
 
 
-0
.0
01
 
-0
.0
01
 
-0
.0
01
 
 
0.
00
3*
**
 
-0
.0
02
* 
-0
.0
02
 
 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
D
iff
.: 
Su
rv
iv
al
 R
at
es
 
0.
00
0 
0.
01
5 
0.
01
6 
 
-0
.2
50
**
*
-0
.3
05
* 
-0
.2
83
* 
 
0.
02
5 
-0
.0
80
 
-0
.0
78
 
 
0.
03
7 
-0
.3
71
**
 
-0
.3
35
* 
 
(0
.0
88
2)
 
(0
.4
60
) 
(0
.4
58
) 
 
(0
.0
37
) 
(0
.1
71
) 
(0
.1
71
) 
 
(0
.0
59
) 
(0
.2
64
) 
(0
.2
64
) 
 
(0
.0
35
) 
(0
.1
80
) 
(0
.1
80
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ti
m
e 
M
ea
ns
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
In
iti
al
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es
 
 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es
 
 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es
 
 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es
 
V
ill
ag
e 
D
um
m
ie
s 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
**
* 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
p<
0.
05
, *
 p
<0
.1
 
T
ab
le
2.
8.
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
L
in
ea
r
D
y
n
am
ic
S
U
R
m
o
d
el
II
,
81
The implication is that perhaps individuals in rural Ethiopia prefer to invest (not sup-
port) in their healthier relatives and turn their face against those with long-term disabilities.
When it comes to short-term illnesses, the story completely reverses. As shown in Tables
(2.7) to (2.8), unlike long-term disabilities, households who suffered from short-term health
shocks such as illnesses receive higher amount of transfers from their relatives (Sender Type
3). However, there is no evidence that informal risk sharing among non-altruistic individuals
provides some kind of insurance against short-term or long-term health shocks.
With regard to how transfers from individuals with different social distances react to lev-
els of survival rates, the result show that older households with higher survival rates than the
village average receives higher amount of transfers from their non-resident family members
and relatives. Somehow, younger households also receive higher transfer from benevolent
formal institutions. These results remain to be the same for different specifications. Finally,
the correlation coefficients (not reported here) show that the amount of transfer from one
sender type is affected by the amount of transfer the other sender makes. Relatives are
less likely to make transfers if a household is also receiving aid from churches, mosques,
government or non-government aid organizations. Hence, transfers from formal institutions
crowd out transfers from individuals who are related along bloodline and kinship such as
non-resident family members and relatives.
2.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
As briefly discussed above, censoring results in exaggerated slope estimates, which is
referred to as “expansion bias”. Recognizing such issue, I conduct sensitivity analysis to
check whether the direction and statistical significance of the coefficients are significantly
affected by censoring. I estimate the model using two alternative empirical specifications.
The first is a Linear Probability model using dummy variable indicating transfer instead of
the amount received and the second is a Tobit model, which explicitly accounts for censoring
issues. The estimation results are shown in Table E.4 in Appendix E. The upper panel
presents the estimates from LPM and the bottom panel from the Tobit model. In both
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cases, the time means and the value of the dependent variable in round 1 are included to
minimize biases related to endogeneity and the initial conditions problem. In addition, in
both cases I focus on using the long-term measures of health capital.
In the LPM specification, in panel (a), the direction of the coefficients on the lagged
dependent variables for the four equations are similar to those obtained in Table 6. Fur-
thermore, similar to the previous estimates, the coefficients are significant with comparable
levels of significance. On the other hand, had censoring been an issue, the estimated slope
coefficients in the Tobit model would be lower in magnitude. Panel (b) shows the Average
Marginal Effects for observation at the censoring point and observations conditional which
are not censored. In both cases the magnitude of the coefficients are closer to zero implying
that censoring is an issue. However, the direction of the coefficients and their significance
are in line with the findings in the linear case. Therefore, exaggerated slope estimates due
to censoring are one of the caveats of the empirical analysis. Future research in this line
could be implementing dynamic Tobit model using flexible specifications of the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity.
2.6 Conclusion
Individuals in many communities face recurrent short-term and long-term health shocks.
In these places, either private insurance markets or public insurance options are missing. The
consensus in the literature is that risk-averse individuals could achieve Pareto optimum if
they involve in a voluntary risk sharing contract to help each other. However, limited com-
mitment and availability of private storage technologies make the first-best optimal allocation
unsustainable. Although, the role of informal risk sharing in providing some sort of insurance
against income shocks is evident in many empirical studies, little is understood if the same
holds for health shocks. Health of individuals has unique features which makes generalizing
the existing empirical support for informal risk sharing against income shocks implausible.
It serves as a storage technology as well as factor of production. Furthermore, individuals
face imperfect and possibly asymmetric information regarding the nature of realized health
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shocks. The role of these features in informal risk sharing contracts is little understood in
the literature.
In this paper, I extend the standard informal risk sharing model with two-sided limited
commitment and storage technology to a regime where health capital serves as a storage
technology and is a factor of production. Besides, individuals face imperfect information
regarding the nature of health shocks. The theoretical results show that there is history
dependence in Pareto optimal allocation which arises as a result of binding participation
constraints but also due to health capital productivities and survival rates which are time
dependent. This implies that informal risk sharing arrangement against health shocks is
unsustainable among non-altruistic individuals with different levels of health capital pro-
ductivities and biological survival rates. This explains the lack of empirical support for the
existence of informal risk sharing among non-altruistic individuals against health shocks.
Furthermore, the results show that optimal consumption and health investment paths are
dependent on the nature of information available to individuals.
Using data from rural Ethiopia, the empirical section of the paper investigates whether
the key predictions of the model hold. I estimate dynamic models of different specifications
and find that there is strong negative history dependence in transfers from non-altruistic
individuals implying that there is limited commitment in informal risk sharing arrangement.
On the contrary, transfers from individuals related to the household along bloodline are
positive history dependent underscoring the role of altruism and social norms in transfer
behavior among households in rural Ethiopia. Furthermore, this study finds no evidence for
the existence of informal risk sharing against either short-term or long-term health shocks
among non-altruistic individuals. However, the results show that individuals related to the
household along bloodline provide some sort of insurance against short-term health shocks
and provide support if the household is older and yet they turn way when the realized shock
is long-term such as physical disability. Finally, although benevolent formal institutions
provide help when households in rural villages face short-term health shocks, they crowd out
transfers from altruistic individuals.
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Appendix A
DETAILED DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL LAPSE DECISION
A policyholder decides to lapse if and only if the expected utility from keeping the policy
is less than or equals to the expected utility without insurance
V ki ≤ V li , (A.1)
where V ki and V
l
i are the values of alternative specific expected utilities on the path of
optimal consumption with and without insurance, respectively. The policyholder maximizes
the expected utility in the insured state which is given by
V ki = max
ci1,c
a
i2,c
d
i2
{u(ci1) + δi[(1− pˆiit)u(cai2) + pˆiitu(cdi2)]}, (A.2)
subject to
ci1 = wi − si − pi,
cai2 = c
d
i2 = (1 + r)si.
(A.3)
where ci1, c
a
i2 and c
d
i2 are levels of consumption in period 1 and period 2 when the person
is in good health (able) and in bad health (disable), respectively. The level of consumption
in period 2 is smoothed because of the insurance. The constrained optimization problem in
(a2) can be re-written as a simple unconstrained maximization given by
V ki = maxsi
{u(wi − si − pi) + δiu((1 + r)si)}. (A.4)
Taking the first order condition, we obtain
u′(wi − si − pi) = (1 + r)δiu′((1 + r)si). (A.5)
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Assuming CARA utility specification u(xi) = − exp(−ψxi), where xi is money, and solving
for the optimal saving s∗i and optimal consumption levels, we get
s∗i =
1
(2 + r)
[(wi − pi) + 1
ψ
ln((1 + r)δi)],
c∗i1 =
1
(2 + r)
[(1 + r)(wi − pi)− 1
ψ
ln((1 + r)δi)],
c∗i2 =
(1 + r)
(2 + r)
[(wi − pi) + 1
ψ
ln((1 + r)δi)].
(A.6)
Then assuming very small r and δi =
1
(1+r)
≈ 1, the value of staying insured is given by
V ki (wi, pi;ψ) = −2 exp(−
ψ
2
(wi − pi)) (A.7)
Similarly, the individual maximizes expected utility without insurance which is given by
V li = max
ci1,c
a
i2,c
d
i2
{u(ci1) + δi[(1− pˆiit)u(cai2) + pˆiitu(cdi2)]}, (A.8)
subject to
ci1 = wi − pi,
cai2 = (1 + r)si,
cdi2 = (1 + r)si −m,
(A.9)
where m ≤ wi is now the cost of LTC. Taking the FOC, using the exponential utility function
and simplifying we get
V li (wi,m, pˆiit;ψ) = − exp(−
ψ
2
wi){
√
pˆiit(2 exp(ψm)− exp(−ψ
2
m)) +
1√
pˆiit
exp(−ψ
2
m).}
(A.10)
Then, the policyholder is indifferent between the two alternatives when
Vi(m, pi, pˆiit;ψ) = V
k
i (wi, pi;ψ)− V li (wi,m, pˆiit;ψ) = 0. (A.11)
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The function Vi(m, pi, pˆiit;ψ) is quadratic in pˆiit which can be simplified to take the form
pˆiit =
1
[
√
exp(ψ(m+ pi))− 2 exp(ψm) + 1− exp(ψ2 (m+ pi))]2
(A.12)
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the policyholders optimal decision for different values of
(m, pi, pˆiit, ψ).
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Appendix B
THE LEARNING PROCESS
Policyholder i’s initial belief about the level of true risk, pii, is assumed to be normally
distributed with initial level of risk belief, pˆii0, and the degree of uncertainty, σ
2
pˆii0
,
Πi0 ∼ n(pˆii0, σ2pˆii0), (B.1)
where
pˆii0 = pii + νi0, (B.2)
and νi0 is the level of bias in initial risk belief. Let the signal in period t = 1 is normally
distributed around the objective risk with variance σ2si as
Πsi1 = pii + ξi1, (B.3)
where ξi1 ∼ n(0, σ2si)is the signal noise. Then using Bayes’ rule, posterior mean risk belief in
period t = 1 is given by
Πi1|Πi0 ∼ n(pˆii1, σ2pˆii1), (B.4)
where
pˆii1 = pii +
σ2pˆii1
σ2pˆii0
pˆii0 +
σ2pˆii1
σ2si
yi1Π
s
i1,
σ2pˆii1 =
(
1
σ2pˆii0
+
1
σ2si
yi1
)−1 (B.5)
and yi1 is a dummy variable indicating ownership of private LTCI policy. By substituting
(b1) and (b2) in (b3) the mean risk belief can be written as
pˆii1 = pii +
1
σ2pˆii0
νi0 +
1
σ2si
yi1ξi1
1
σ2pˆii0
+ 1
σ2si
yi1
. (B.6)
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By recursive substitution, the mean risk belief and the variance for t periods can be written
as
pˆiit = pii +
1
σ2pˆii0
νi0 +
1
σ2si
Σtτ=1yiτξiτ
1
σ2pˆii0
+ 1
σ2si
Σtτ=1yiτ
,
σ2pˆiit =
(
1
σ2pˆii0
+
1
σ2si
Σtτ=1yiτ
)−1
.
(B.7)
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Appendix C
ESTIMATION ALGORITHM OF THE LEARNING MODEL
From equation (1.16) and (1.17), the model with learning structure can be written as
Pr(dit = 1|Xit, pii, θ, σ2pˆi0 , νi0, ξit) = Pr
[
it ≤ αi + γiHit +
1
σ2pˆi0
νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξiτ
1
σ2pˆi0
+ ni(t)
+ θXit
]
(C.1)
where it ∼ n(0, 1). Using latent variable form letting, we can compactly write the expression
as
d∗it = ΓiHit +
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
+ θXit + it (C.2)
where Γi = [αi γi], is a vector of random coefficients, and θ is a vector of fixed param-
eters. Then the kernel for the joint posterior latent variables and parameters augmented
distribution is given by
p({d∗it}, {Γi},Γ,Σ, ln(σ−2pˆi0 ), {ξiτ}tτ=1|H,X, n, d) ∝
N∏
i=1
Ti∏
t=1
{
exp(−0.5(d∗it − ΓiHit −
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
− θXit)2)
×(I(dit = 0)I(d∗it ≤ 0) + I(dit = 1)I(d∗it ≥ 0))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5(θ − µθ0)′V −1θ0 (θ − µθ0))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5(Γi − Γ)′Σ−1(Γi − Γ))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5(Γ− µΓ0)′V −1Γ0 (Γ− µΓ0)
}
×
{
|Σ|( g0−k−12 )
|S0|
g0
2
exp(−0.5tr(ΣS−10 ))
}
×
{
exp(−0.5 1
Vσ0
(ln(σ−2pˆi0 )− µσ0)2)
}
×
{
exp(−0.5ξ2it)
}
(C.3)
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Priors of the model
p(Γ) ∼ n(µΓ0 , VΓ0) = n(0, 100I)
p(θ) ∼ n(µθ0 , Vθ0) = n(0, 100I)
p(Σ) ∼ iw(g0, S0) = iw(k + 1, I)
p({ξiτ=1}t) ∼ n(0, 1)
p(ln(σ−2pˆi0 )) ∼ n(µσ0 , Vσ0) = n(0, 100I)
(C.4)
Sampling steps:
1. Sample d∗it
2. Sample Γi for each individual using Gibbs
3. Sample Γ using Gibbs
4. Sample θ using Gibbs
5. Sample Σ using Gibbs
6. Sample ln(σ−2pˆi0 ) using MH
7. Sample {ξiτ=1}t for each individual using MH
Detailed Algorithm:
1. Draw the latent variables d∗it from the conditional truncated normal distribution
d∗it|rest ∼

TN(−∞,0](µit, 1), if dit = 0
TN(0,)(µit, 1), if dit = 1
Where
µit = ΓiHit +
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
+ θXit
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2. Draw Γi for each individual using Gibbs steps from the following unconditional normal
distribution
p(Γi|rest) ∼ exp
(
−1
2
( Ti∑
t=1
(d˜∗it − ΓiHit)2 + (Γi − Γ)′Σ−1(Γi − Γ)
))
,
where
d˜∗it = d
∗
it −
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
− θXit.
3. Sample Γ using Gibbs steps from the following multivariate normal distribution
p(Γ|rest) ∼ exp
(
−1
2
( N∑
i=1
(Γi − Γ)′Σ−1(Γi − Γ) + (Γ− µΓ0)′V −1Γ0 (Γ− µΓ0)
))
4. Sample θ using Gibbs steps from the following multivariate normal distribution
p(θ|rest) ∼ exp
(
−1
2
( N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
(d˜∗it − θXit)2 + (θ − µθ0)′V −1θ0 (θ − µθ0)
))
,
where
d˜∗it = d
∗
it − ΓiHit −
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
.
5. Sample Σ using Gibbs sampler from the following Inverse Wishart distribution
p(Σ|rest) ∼ |Σ|
(
g0−k−1
2
)
|S0|
g0
2
exp
(
−0.5tr(ΣS−10 ) +
N∑
i=1
(Γi − Γ)′Σ−1(Γi − Γ)
)
6. Sample ln(σ−2pˆi0 ) using Metropolis-Hastings algorithm from the following distribution
p(ln(σ−2pˆi0 )|rest) ∼
N∏
i=1
Ti∏
t=1
exp
((
d˜∗it −
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
)2
+
1
Vσ0
(
ln(σ−2pˆi0 )− µσ0
)2)
,
where
d˜∗it = d
∗
it − ΓiHit − θXit.
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7. Sample {ξiτ}tτ=1 for each individual using Metropolis-Hastings algorithm from the fol-
lowing distribution
p({ξiτ}tτ=1|rest) ∼
N∏
i=1
exp
(
−1
2
(
d˜∗it −
σ−2pˆi0 νi0 + Σ
t
τ=1ξit
σ−2pˆi0 + ni(t)
)2
+ {ξ2iτ}tτ=1
)
.
where
d˜∗it = d
∗
it − ΓiHit − θXit.
Cycle through steps 1-7 until convergence.
98
Appendix D
ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 1
Table D.1. Full Regression Results of Linear Probability Model: Pooled OLSFull Regression Results of Linear Probability Model: Pooled OLS 
 A. HRS  B. The AHEAD  
VARIABLES All Obs. 
Excluding 
Left- 
Censored All Obs. 
Excluding 
Left- 
Censored 
Subj. Prob.: ex-ante -0.107*** -0.111*** -0.022 -0.008 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.021) (0.037) 
Ln(household income): pre-purchase 0.007 -0.027** -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) 
Dummy: missing ln(hhinc) -0.233 -0.003 0.357 - 
 (0.163) (0.264) (0.285)  
NH coverage only -0.021 0.001 0.005 -0.000 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.015) (0.030) 
Home Care coverage only 0.092*** 0.117*** -0.021 -0.018 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.022) (0.035) 
ADLs: lagged 0.020 0.051** -0.018 0.019 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.012) (0.021) 
IADLs: lagged  0.007 0.078** 0.003 0.074** 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.018) (0.029) 
No. of Conditions: lagged -0.033** -0.040* -0.058*** -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.010) (0.026) 
SRHS: lagged 0.000 0.023** -0.013** -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) 
Married: lagged -0.022 0.003 0.009 -0.063** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) 
Female  0.012 0.096 -0.189 0.237 
 (0.653) (0.594) (0.362) (0.676) 
White  -0.046** -0.023 -0.043* -0.022 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.041) 
Household size: lagged 0.018** 0.003 0.022** 0.019 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) 
No. of live children: lag 0.005** 0.012*** 0.006* 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
No. of live siblings: lag 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Years of educ. -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Veteran status -0.020 -0.012 0.059*** -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.040) 
Owns life insurance: lag 0.015 -0.013 0.021 0.025 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) 
Owns other health ins.: lag -0.018 -0.004 0.021 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) 
Ever smoke: lag 0.020* 0.026 0.033** -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) 
Ln(wealth): lag -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Dummy: missing Ln(wealth) -0.031 -0.027 -0.018 -0.131 
 (0.054) (0.067) (0.036) (0.109) 
Medial inflation rate 0.043 0.014 0.006 0.042 
 (0.071) (0.343) (0.072) (0.387) 
Constant -0.094 0.680 0.452 0.503 
 (0.389) (1.420) (0.757) (1.904) 
Observations 4,038 2,226 4,064 1,593 
R-squared 0.300 0.214 0.250 0.242 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
99
De
pe
nd
en
t V
ari
ab
le:
Po
lic
y V
ari
ab
le:
Co
eff
.
St
d. 
Er
r
Co
eff
.
St
d. 
Er
r
Co
eff
.
St
d. 
Er
r
Co
eff
.
St
d. 
Er
r
No
 co
ntr
ols
0.0
50
5*
(0
.02
9)
0.0
08
15
(0
.02
9)
-0
.11
6*
**
(0
.02
9)
-0
.07
88
**
*
(0
.02
9)
[+
]P
re-
pu
rch
as
e; 
Co
ve
rag
e T
yp
e
0.0
04
07
(0
.02
7)
-0
.00
93
6
(0
.02
8)
-0
.10
6*
**
(0
.02
6)
-0
.09
28
**
*
(0
.02
7)
[+
]D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st
0.0
08
97
(0
.02
7)
-0
.00
85
2
(0
.02
8)
-0
.08
37
**
*
(0
.02
6)
-0
.08
10
**
*
(0
.02
7)
[+
]W
ea
lth
 &
 O
the
r I
ns
ur
an
ce
 O
wn
ers
hip
0.0
01
84
(0
.02
7)
-0
.01
25
0
(0
.02
8)
-0
.08
06
**
*
(0
.02
6)
-0
.08
06
**
*
(0
.02
6)
[+
]M
ed
. I
nf
lat
ion
-0
.01
51
(0
.02
7)
-0
.01
50
0
(0
.02
8)
-0
.08
04
**
*
(0
.02
6)
-0
.08
05
**
*
(0
.02
6)
[+
]R
eg
ion
al 
Du
mm
ies
-0
.01
06
(0
.02
7)
-0
.01
09
0
(0
.02
8)
-0
.06
95
**
*
(0
.02
6)
-0
.06
95
**
*
(0
.02
6)
[+
]R
eg
ion
 B
y Y
ea
r D
um
mi
es
-0
.06
34
**
(0
.02
8)
-0
.02
15
0
(0
.02
9)
-0
.06
37
**
(0
.02
6)
-0
.06
35
**
(0
.02
6)
[+
]In
ter
ac
tio
n P
re-
Pu
rch
as
e H
ea
lth
-0
.04
88
*
(0
.02
8)
-0
.01
90
4
(0
.03
0)
-0
.06
94
**
(0
.02
7)
-0
.07
43
**
*
(0
.02
7)
No
. O
bs
. =
 4,
08
8
No
. O
bs
. =
 4,
08
8
No
te:
 S
tan
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
in 
pa
ren
the
se
s *
**
 p<
0.0
1, 
**
 p<
0.0
5, 
* p
<0
.1.
 1)
 P
re-
Pu
rch
as
e; 
Co
ve
rag
e T
yp
e i
nc
lud
es
: p
re-
pu
rch
as
e a
ge
, A
DL
s, 
IA
DL
s, 
No
. o
f d
oc
tor
 di
ag
no
se
d c
on
dit
ion
s e
ve
r h
ad
 an
d l
og
 of
 in
co
me
; a
nd
 C
ov
era
ge
 T
yp
e i
nc
lud
es
, d
um
my
 fo
r N
H 
on
ly 
co
ve
rag
e a
nd
 du
mm
y 
fo
r H
om
e C
are
 on
ly 
co
ve
rag
e, 
2)
 D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st 
inc
lud
e d
em
og
rap
hic
 ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s s
uc
h a
s m
ari
tal
 st
atu
s, 
se
x, 
rac
e, 
ye
ars
 of
 ed
uc
ati
on
, 
ho
us
eh
old
 si
ze
, n
o. 
of
 li
ve
 ch
ild
ren
, n
o. 
of
 li
ve
 si
bli
ng
s a
nd
 ve
ter
an
 st
atu
s; 
an
d E
x-
po
st 
he
alt
h v
ec
tor
 su
ch
 A
DL
s, 
 IA
DL
s, 
no
. o
f c
on
dit
ion
s a
nd
 
SR
HS
. 3
) W
ea
lth
 an
d O
the
r I
ns
ur
an
ce
 O
wn
ers
hip
 in
clu
de
s l
og
 of
 w
ea
lth
; a
nd
 li
fe 
ins
ur
an
ce
 ow
ne
rsh
ip,
 an
d o
the
r p
riv
ate
 he
alt
h i
ns
ur
an
ce
 
ow
ne
rsh
ip 
oth
er 
tha
n t
ho
se
 pr
ov
ide
d b
y g
ov
't a
nd
 L
TC
I c
ov
era
ge
. 4
) m
ed
ica
l I
nf
lat
ion
 in
clu
de
 in
fla
tio
n l
ev
els
 by
 re
gio
n. 
5)
 R
eg
ion
al 
Du
mm
ies
 
inc
lud
e d
um
mi
es
 fo
r c
en
su
s d
ivi
sio
ns
. 7
) I
nte
rac
tio
n p
re-
pu
rch
as
e H
ea
lth
 in
clu
de
 du
mm
ies
 fo
r i
nte
rac
tio
n t
erm
s b
etw
ee
n e
ac
h l
ev
el 
of
 ag
e, 
AD
Ls
, I
AD
Ls
, n
o. 
of
 co
nd
iti
on
s, 
an
d s
ex
.
Ta
ble
 7:
 R
eg
res
sio
n R
es
ult
s o
f L
ine
ar 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty 
M
od
el
La
ps
e D
um
my
Ex
-p
os
t S
ub
jec
tiv
e P
ro
ba
bil
ity
 [0
,1]
Co
ntr
ols
A.
 T
he
 O
rig
in
al 
HR
S 
Co
ho
rt
B.
 T
he
 A
HE
AD
 C
oh
or
t
Po
ole
d O
LS
Ra
nd
om
 E
ffe
cts
Po
ole
d O
LS
Ra
nd
om
 E
ffe
cts
No
. O
bs
. =
 3,
27
1
No
. O
bs
. =
 3,
27
1
T
ab
le
D
.2
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
L
in
ea
r
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
M
o
d
el
,
100
De
pe
nd
en
t V
ari
ab
le:
Po
lic
y V
ari
ab
le:
Co
eff
.
St
d. 
Er
r
AM
E
St
d. 
De
v.
Co
eff
.
St
d. 
Er
r
AM
E
St
d. 
De
v.
No
 co
ntr
ols
-0
.12
7*
**
(0
.03
7)
0.0
48
(0
.00
2)
-0
.04
2
(0
.04
2)
-0
.11
3*
**
(0
.00
3)
[+
]P
re-
pu
rch
as
e; 
Co
ve
rag
e T
yp
e
-0
.13
8*
**
(0
.06
2)
-0
.04
6
(0
.01
7)
[+
]D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st
-0
.12
5*
**
(0
.03
6)
-0
.13
4*
**
(0
.06
5)
-0
.08
83
**
(0
.04
1)
-0
.08
4*
*
(0
.03
7)
[+
]W
ea
lth
 &
 O
the
r I
ns
ur
an
ce
 O
wn
ers
hip
-0
.11
9*
**
(0
.03
6)
-0
.13
8*
**
(0
.06
8)
-0
.08
73
**
(0
.04
0)
-0
.08
6*
*
(0
.03
8)
[+
]M
ed
. I
nf
lat
ion
-0
.09
48
**
(0
.03
7)
-0
.14
5*
**
(0
.07
3)
-0
.08
49
**
(0
.04
0)
-0
.08
4*
*
(0
.03
8)
[+
]R
eg
ion
al 
Du
mm
ies
-0
.15
2*
**
(0
.07
6)
-0
.08
6*
*
(0
.03
9)
Ta
ble
 8:
 R
eg
res
sio
n R
es
ult
s o
f L
PM
: F
ixe
d E
ffe
cts
Co
ntr
ols
Th
e H
RS
 C
oh
or
t
Th
e A
HE
AD
 C
oh
or
t
Fi
xe
d E
ffe
cts
Co
rre
lat
ed
 R
an
do
m 
Ef
fec
ts
Fi
xe
d E
ffe
cts
Co
rre
lat
ed
 R
an
do
m 
Ef
fec
ts
No
. O
bs
. =
 4,
08
8
No
. O
bs
. =
 4,
08
8
Ex
-p
os
t S
ub
jec
tiv
e P
ro
ba
bil
ity
 [0
,1]
La
ps
e D
um
my
No
. O
bs
. =
 3,
27
1
No
. O
bs
. =
 3,
27
1
No
te:
 S
tan
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
in 
pa
ren
the
se
s *
**
 p<
0.0
1, 
**
 p<
0.0
5, 
* p
<0
.1.
 1)
 P
re-
Pu
rch
as
e; 
Co
ve
rag
e T
yp
e i
nc
lud
es
: p
re-
pu
rch
as
e a
ge
, A
DL
s, 
IA
DL
s, 
No
. o
f d
oc
tor
 di
ag
no
se
d c
on
dit
ion
s e
ve
r h
ad
 an
d l
og
 of
 in
co
me
; a
nd
 C
ov
era
ge
 T
yp
e i
nc
lud
es
, d
um
my
 fo
r N
H 
on
ly 
co
ve
rag
e a
nd
 du
mm
y f
or
 H
om
e 
Ca
re 
on
ly 
co
ve
rag
e, 
2)
 D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st 
inc
lud
e d
em
og
rap
hic
 ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s s
uc
h a
s m
ari
tal
 st
atu
s, 
se
x, 
rac
e, 
ye
ars
 of
 ed
uc
ati
on
, h
ou
se
ho
ld 
siz
e, 
no
. o
f l
ive
 ch
ild
ren
, n
o. 
of
 li
ve
 si
bli
ng
s a
nd
 ve
ter
an
 st
atu
s; 
an
d E
x-
po
st 
he
alt
h v
ec
tor
 su
ch
 A
DL
s, 
 IA
DL
s, 
no
. o
f c
on
dit
ion
s a
nd
 S
RH
S.
 3)
 W
ea
lth
 
an
d O
the
r I
ns
ur
an
ce
 O
wn
ers
hip
 in
clu
de
s l
og
 of
 w
ea
lth
; a
nd
 li
fe 
ins
ur
an
ce
 ow
ne
rsh
ip,
 an
d o
the
r p
riv
ate
 he
alt
h i
ns
ur
an
ce
 ow
ne
rsh
ip 
oth
er 
tha
n t
ho
se
 
pr
ov
ide
d b
y g
ov
't a
nd
 L
TC
I c
ov
era
ge
. 4
) m
ed
ica
l I
nf
lat
ion
 in
clu
de
 in
fla
tio
n l
ev
els
 by
 re
gio
n. 
5)
 R
eg
ion
al 
Du
mm
ies
 in
clu
de
 du
mm
ies
 fo
r c
en
su
s 
div
isi
on
s. 
7)
 In
ter
ac
tio
n p
re-
pu
rch
as
e H
ea
lth
 in
clu
de
 du
mm
ies
 fo
r i
nte
rac
tio
n t
erm
s b
etw
ee
n e
ac
h l
ev
el 
of
 ag
e, 
AD
Ls
, I
AD
Ls
, n
o. 
of
 co
nd
iti
on
s, 
an
d 
se
x.
T
ab
le
D
.3
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
L
P
M
:
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
,
101
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e:
Po
lic
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
e:
M
ar
gi
na
l 
Ef
fe
ct
s
St
d.
 D
ev
.
M
ar
gi
na
l 
Ef
fe
ct
s
St
d.
 D
ev
.
M
ar
gi
na
l 
Ef
fe
ct
s
St
d.
 
D
ev
.
M
ar
gi
na
l 
Ef
fe
ct
s
St
d.
 D
ev
.
Ex
-p
os
t S
ub
je
ct
iv
e 
Pr
ob
.
-0
.1
18
(0
.0
72
)
-0
.1
47
(0
.1
51
)
-0
.0
79
(0
.0
27
)
-0
.1
32
(0
.0
66
)
N
o.
 o
f I
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
95
7
95
7
66
0
66
0
N
o.
 o
f O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
31
19
31
19
21
47
21
47
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
.
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
.
M
ea
n
St
d.
 
D
ev
.
M
ea
n
St
d.
 D
ev
.
In
te
rc
ep
t
2.
46
2
(0
.5
78
)
2.
46
2
(0
.5
78
)
0.
94
1
(0
.1
68
)
0.
94
1
(0
.1
68
)
Ex
-p
os
t S
ub
je
ct
iv
e 
Pr
ob
.
1.
28
5
(0
.3
05
)
1.
28
5
(0
.3
05
)
0.
95
1
(0
.1
70
)
0.
95
1
(0
.1
70
)
A
D
Ls
1.
32
6
(0
.2
54
)
1.
32
6
(0
.2
54
)
1.
61
5
(0
.3
90
)
1.
61
5
(0
.3
90
)
IA
D
Ls
1.
33
8
(0
.2
97
)
1.
33
8
(0
.2
97
)
1.
09
5
(0
.2
16
)
1.
09
5
(0
.2
16
)
N
o.
 o
f C
on
di
tio
ns
0.
43
8
(0
.0
45
)
0.
43
8
(0
.0
45
)
0.
45
7
(0
.0
50
)
0.
45
7
(0
.0
50
)
SR
H
S
0.
51
6
(0
.0
67
)
0.
51
6
(0
.0
67
)
0.
53
1
(0
.0
76
)
0.
53
1
(0
.0
76
)
Ta
bl
e 
9:
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 o
f R
an
do
m
 E
ffe
ct
s/
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 P
ro
bi
t M
od
el
 (H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l B
ay
es
ia
n 
A
pp
ro
ac
h)
Th
e 
O
rig
in
al
 H
R
S 
C
oh
or
t
Th
e 
A
H
EA
D
 C
oh
or
t
N
ot
e:
 A
ll 
of
 th
e 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s a
re
 st
at
is
tic
al
ly
 si
gn
fic
an
t (
i.e
, w
ith
in
 tw
o 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
). 
C
on
tro
lls
: 1
) P
re
-P
ur
ch
as
e;
 C
ov
er
ag
e 
Ty
pe
 in
cl
ud
es
: p
re
-
pu
rc
ha
se
 a
ge
, A
D
Ls
, I
A
D
Ls
, N
o.
 o
f d
oc
to
r d
ia
gn
os
ed
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 e
ve
r h
ad
 a
nd
 lo
g 
of
 in
co
m
e;
 a
nd
 C
ov
er
ag
e 
Ty
pe
 in
cl
ud
es
, d
um
m
y 
fo
r N
H
 o
nl
y 
co
ve
ra
ge
 a
nd
 d
um
m
y 
fo
r H
om
e 
C
ar
e 
on
ly
 c
ov
er
ag
e,
 2
) D
em
og
. &
 E
x-
po
st
 in
cl
ud
e 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s s
uc
h 
as
 m
ar
ita
l s
ta
tu
s, 
se
x,
 ra
ce
, y
ea
rs
 
of
 e
du
ca
tio
n,
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 si
ze
, n
o.
 o
f l
iv
e 
ch
ild
re
n,
 n
o.
 o
f l
iv
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 a
nd
 v
et
er
an
 st
at
us
; a
nd
 E
x-
po
st
 h
ea
lth
 v
ec
to
r s
uc
h 
A
D
Ls
,  
IA
D
Ls
, n
o.
 o
f 
co
nd
iti
on
s a
nd
 S
R
H
S.
 3
) W
ea
lth
 a
nd
 O
th
er
 In
su
ra
nc
e 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
in
cl
ud
es
 lo
g 
of
 w
ea
lth
; a
nd
 li
fe
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p,
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 p
riv
at
e 
he
al
th
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
th
os
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
go
v'
t a
nd
 L
TC
I c
ov
er
ag
e.
 4
) m
ed
ic
al
 In
fla
tio
n 
in
cl
ud
e 
in
fla
tio
n 
le
ve
ls
 b
y 
re
gi
on
. 5
) R
eg
io
na
l 
D
um
m
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
 d
um
m
ie
s f
or
 c
en
su
s d
iv
is
io
ns
. T
he
 to
ta
l n
um
be
r o
f i
te
ra
tio
n 
is
 1
0,
00
0 
w
ith
 a
 b
ur
n-
in
 o
f 5
,0
00
. T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
on
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 
nu
m
be
r o
f b
ur
n-
in
s w
as
 g
ui
de
d 
by
 G
ew
ek
e’
s c
on
ve
rg
en
ce
 d
ia
gn
os
tic
s (
G
ew
ek
e,
 1
99
2)
.  
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 th
e 
sq
ua
re
 ro
ot
 o
f t
he
 d
ia
go
na
l 
el
em
en
ts
 o
f v
ar
ia
nc
e-
co
va
ria
nc
e 
m
at
rix
 o
f t
he
 ra
nd
om
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
. 
R
an
do
m
   
Ef
fe
ct
s
R
an
do
m
 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
R
an
do
m
   
  E
ffe
ct
s
R
an
do
m
 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
Ex
-p
os
t S
ub
je
ct
iv
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 [0
,1
]
La
ps
e 
D
um
m
y
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
 (V
ar
ia
nc
es
)
T
ab
le
D
.4
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
R
an
d
om
E
ff
ec
ts
/C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
P
ro
b
it
M
o
d
el
(H
ie
ra
rc
h
ic
al
B
ay
es
ia
n
A
p
p
ro
ac
h
)
,
102
Appendix E
ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2
Table E.1. Conditional Transfers in Birr (Survey Rounds 1994 1997)
31 
 
Table 3: Conditional Transfers in Birr (Survey Rounds 1994 – 1997) 
No. of 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sender Type 1 72 113.66 84.50 8.00 385.00 
Sender Type 2 238 107.93 135.26 0.60 750.00 
Sender Type 3 161 35.21 29.43 3.00 200.00 
Sender Type 4 798 140.41 204.06 0.002 2075.18 
All Sender 1194 126.95 183.67 1.30 2075.18 
Note: Birr is the local currency in Ethiopia. According to the National 
Bank of Ethiopia, the exchange rate for 1 USD = 6.32 Birr in 1994 and 
7.06 Birr in 1997/198. 
Note: Transfers 
The survey asks households in about transfers they received in the past four months. The survey 
questions are phrased as follows.  Round 1: "Has the household received any other income (such 
as remittances, gifts or other transfers) in the last four months?”, Round 2: "Has the household 
received any other income (such as remittances, gifts or other transfers) since our last visit?", 
Round 3: "Has the household received any other income (such as remittances from friends or 
relatives, gifts, food aid or other aid, or other transfers) SINCE OUR LAST VISIT?" and Round 
4: "Has the household received any other income (such as remittances from friends/relatives, 
gifts, food aid/other aid, other transfers) IN THE LAST FOUR MONTHS?". Although, there is 
slight variation in the phrasing of Round 3 question, the actual elapsed time between the end of 
round 2 and round 3 is approximately 4 months for most villages.  
Transfers from sender type 1 include transfer from non-resident family members. Transfers from 
sender type 2 include transfers from relatives. Transfers from sender type 3 include transfers 
from Friends, neighbors, Iqqub, Iddir, and others in the village. Transfers from sender type 4 
include transfers from benevolent institutions such as churches, mosques, and government and 
non-government aid organizations. Conditional transfers are transfers conditional on receiving 
positive transfers.  
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Table E.2. Transfers and Conditional Transfers by Rounds
32 
 
Table 3: Transfers and Conditional Transfers by Rounds 
  
Proportions   Conditional Log Transfers 
No. of 
Obs. Mean   
No. of 
Obs. Mean S.e. 
Transfer from any Sender 5803 20.66%   1199 4.248 0.032
Round 1 1,475 8.41% 124 3.969 0.090
Round 2  1,464 34.08% 499 4.738 0.050
Round 3  1,460 14.32% 209 4.037 0.066
Round 4  1,404 26.14% 367 3.797 0.050
Transfer from Sender Type 1 5803 1.24% 72 4.379 0.981
Round 1 1,475 0.88% 13 4.364 0.258
Round 2  1,464 1.43% 21 4.572 0.162
Round 3  1,460 1.03% 15 4.254 0.218
Round 4  1,404 1.64% 23 4.292 0.266
Transfer from Sender Type 2 5803 4.10% 238 4.072 1.181
Round 1 1,475 4.54% 67 3.966 0.128
Round 2  1,464 3.28% 48 4.215 0.170
Round 3  1,460 4.25% 62 4.275 0.148
Round 4  1,404 4.34% 61 3.869 0.168
Transfer from Sender Type 3 5803 2.77% 161 3.376 0.633
Round 1 1,475 0.81% 12 3.463 0.163
Round 2  1,464 2.05% 30 3.308 0.126
Round 3  1,460 1.44% 21 3.651 0.214
Round 4  1,404 6.98% 98 3.327 0.052
Transfer from Sender Type 4 5803 13.75% 798 4.369 1.103
Round 1 1,475 2.58% 38 3.874 0.153
Round 2  1,464 29.51% 432 4.811 0.052
Round 3  1,460 8.42% 123 3.874 0.069
Round 4  1,404 14.60%   205 3.828 0.064
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Table E.3. No. of Receipts by Sender Type and Rounds
33 
 
Table 4: No. of Receipts by Sender Type and Rounds 
  
All 
Rounds 
Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Round 
3 
Round 
4 Percent 
Sender Type 1 only 59 11 14 12 22 4.92%
Sender Type 2 only 202 62 34 52 54 16.85%
Sender Type 3 only 126 9 17 15 85 10.51%
Sender Type 4 only 743 36 403 118 186 61.97%
Senders Type 1 and 2 only 5 1 2 2 0 0.42%
Senders Type 1 and 3 only 1 0 0 1 0 0.08%
Senders Type 1 and 4 only 6 1 4 0 1 0.50%
Senders Type 2 and 3 only 8 3 0 4 1 0.67%
Senders Type 2 and 4 only 22 1 11 4 6 1.83%
Senders Type 4 and 4 only 26 0 13 1 12 2.17%
Senders Type 1, 2 and 3 only 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
Senders Type 1, 2 and 4 only 1 0 1 0 0 0.08%
Senders Type 1, 3 and 4 only 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
Senders Type 2, 3 and 4 only 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
Senders Type 1,2, 3 and 4  0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
No. of recipients 1199 124 499 209 367 100.00%
Total no. of observations 5,803 1,475 1,464 1,460 1,404 
Percent of recipients 20.66% 8.41% 34.08% 14.32% 26.14% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E.4. Sensitivity Analysis Estimation Results - LPM
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Table 11: Estimation Results - Long-Term Health Shocks 
 
Method: Dynamic Random Effects Estimates of LPM and Tobit Specifications 
 
VARIABLES 
Marginal Effects 
Sender 
Type 1 
Sender 
Type 2 
Sender 
Type 3 
 Sender 
Type 4 
Lagged: Transfer Dummy  0.076***  0.058***  -0.040*  -0.250*** 
 (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.018) 
Diff.: Long-term health shocks 0.000  -0.002  -0.003  -0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Diff.: Survival Rates -0.067  -0.123  -0.023  -0.157 
 (0.064)  (0.107)  (0.089)  (0.167) 
Initial Conditions Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Time Means Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Year Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Village Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
        
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix F
ADDITIONAL FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1
Figure F.1. Kaplan-Meier Survival and Smoothed Hazard Curves
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Figure F.3. Optimal Lapse: IllustrationFigure 4: Illustration: Optimal Lapse Decision
.
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Note: The graphs illustrate the policyholder’s optimal lapse decision. The lines represent the indiﬀerence
set for diﬀerent values of (pi,m, ψi, πˆit) presented in equation (5). For any given value of LTC cost, ln(m),
higher level of risk belief makes maintaining the LTCI insurance optimal. Similarly, for any given level of
risk belief higher LTC cost makes maintaining the policy optimal. Higher level of absolute risk aversion,
ψi, makes the decision to maintain the insurance optimal. Finally, a higher level of premium, ln(pi), makes
lapsing optimal.
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Figure F.4. History of LTCI premium adjustment
Figure 5: History of LTCI premium Adjustments and Medical Inﬂation
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Figure F.5. MCMC Convergence Plots
Figure 8: Trace Plot of the Posterior estimate
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Note: Panel (a) is the posterior estimate of the coeﬃcient on ex-ante subjective probability, Panel (b) is
the posterior estimate of the coeﬃcient on ex-post subjective probability, Panel (c) and (d) are the posterior
estimates of the uncertainty parameter in the learning model, ln(σ−2πˆ0 ) and σπˆ0 .
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Appendix G
ADDITIONAL FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2
Figure G.1. Signal Noise and Bayesian Learning
Figure 2: Signal Noise and Bayesian Learning
Note: panel (a) shows the signal noise individual 1 and individual 2 faces in each period. Panel (b) and
(c) show the expected health capital productivities under two information regimes: Perfect information (red
dotted line) and imperfect information with Bayesian Learning behavior (blue solid line).
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